The independence of independent directors - A comparative study by LIN LIN
  
THE INDEPENDENCE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 











A THESIS SUBMITTED 
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAWS 
FACULTY OF LAW 











I owe my sincerest appreciation to my dear parents for providing me with a good 
education, and to my supervisor Associate Professor Tan Cheng Han for his kind 
guidance and support. 
                                                                                   - 2 - 
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
Section I. The global economic background 
Section II. The modern company vehicle and the problem of “agency costs” 
Section III. The origin of corporate governance 
Section IV. The importance of corporate governance 
 
Chapter 2: The review on the current supervisory mechanism 
Section I. The Anglo-American Model 
A. The unitary board and the independent directors 
B. The increasing requirements on the quantum of independent directors in 
the board 
C. The corporate governance framework in the United Kingdom 
D. The “comply or explain” principle and the “soft” law 
Section II. The German Model 
Section III. The Chinese Model 
A.  The corporate governance structure before 1997 
B. The paradox in the corporate governance structure and its disadvantages 
C. The current corporate governance structure 
1. The preliminary stage 
2. The developing stage 
                                                                                   - 3 - 
3. The mandatory regulation  
Section IV. Conclusion  
 
Chapter 3: The role of the independent directors  
Section I. The status of the independent directors in the legal framework 
A. The status in the eye of the written law 
B. The status in the eye of the case law 
1. The fiduciary duty 
2. The duty of care and skill  
(1) The “ordinary man” standard 
(2) A case study – Daniels v Anderson 
(3) A case study – Lu Jia Hao v CSRC 
(4) Conclusion 
C. The status in the eye of the corporate governance rules  
1. The strategy viewpoint 
2. The intermediate viewpoint 
3. The monitoring viewpoint 
D. Conclusion  
Section II. Arguments for the unitary role of monitors  
A. A historical view on the purpose of independent directors  
B. The residual risk of managerial discretion 
C. The potential undermining of the independence  
                                                                                   - 4 - 
D. Ineffectiveness stemming from heavy workload 
E. Conclusion  
    Section III. How to resolve the confusion and improve the effectiveness of 
monitoring role 
 
Chapter 4: The concept of independence 
Section I. The clarification of several similar concepts  
Section II. The definition of “independent directors” 
A. The infeasibility of the catch-all definition of “independence” 
B. The complementary criteria concerning “independence” 
1. The United Kingdom 
2. The United States 
(1) The scandal year 2002 
(2) The new proposal on the “independence” standards 
3. China 
(1) The regulatory standards on the “independence” 
(2) Some comments on Chinese standards 
C. Conclusion 
 Section III. Who should have a final say in judging independence? 
 
Chapter 5: Supervisory board v Independent committees  
Section I. The supervisory board within the dual board system 
                                                                                   - 5 - 
A. The arguments for the supervisory board  
B. The argument against the supervisory board 
Section II. The independent committees within the unitary board system  
A. The successful compromise – independent committees 
1. Theoretical evidence 
2. Empirical evidence 
B. De Facto dual board – the practice in the United States 
Section III. Conclusion 
 
Chapter 6: Common problems with independent directors and possible 
solutions  
Section I. The alleged dissatisfactory performance by the independent directors 
A. The negative comments against the independent directors 
B. The extremely high expectations and the need to cool down 
Section II. Common problems and possible solutions 
A. Lacking of available time 
1. Problem  
2. Resolutions  
B. Information inadequateness 
1. Problem 
2. Resolutions 
C. Collegiality within the board  
                                                                                   - 6 - 
1. Problem 
2. Resolutions 
D. Lacking of dependence on shareholders 
1. Problem 
2. Resolutions 
(1) A win – win approach between the independent directors and 
the institutional investors  
(2) Exception in China  
Section III. Conclusion  
 
Chapter 7: The appointment of independent directors 
Section I: The problems in the appointment of independent directors 
A. Appointing directors directly when there is a casual vacancy 
B. Selecting the candidate they like through proxy in shareholders’ 
meetings 
C. Giving advice in the nomination process 
D. Conclusion 
Section II. The pool of independent directors  
A. The popular candidates for independent directors at present 
B. Calling for the board with great diversity 
C. The involvement of a third party  
1. The free labor market of independent directors  
                                                                                   - 7 - 
2. Market for lemons – an economic theory  
3. Intervention from a third party – lesson from the “market for 
lemons” 
(1) The analogy between the market of used cars and the labor 
market of independent directors  
(2) Who is eligible to be the third party to intervene? 
(3) Intervention form the public sector – Chinese practice  
(4) Help from the private sector – British practice 
D. Conclusion  
Section III. The nomination of independent directors  
A. Shareholders’ involvement in the nominating process 
B. Proposals from ABA Task Force 
C. The supplementary mechanism  
Section IV. The election of independent directors 
Section V. Conclusion  
 
Chapter 8: The remuneration of independent directors  
Section I. The problems with remuneration of independent directors  
Section II. What constitute the appropriate remuneration? 
A. The appropriate level of remuneration 
B. The appropriate form of remuneration 
1. The increasing use of performance – related remuneration 
                                                                                   - 8 - 
2. The stock option as remuneration to independent directors 
C. Who should decide the remuneration for independent directors? 
1. The interlock determination on remuneration between independent 
and executive directors 
2. Shareholders’ activism in the remuneration design 
3. Intervention from a third party outside the company and indirect 
payment system 
Section III. Conclusion 
 
Chapter 9: Moral requirements for independent directors 
 









                                                                                   - 9 - 
Summary 
The value of independent directors is one of the most controversial issues in the 
realm of corporate governance. The results from the various empirical studies are 
mixed and inconclusive. On some occasions the boards with a majority of 
independent directors perform better and well improve the corporate performance, 
while in others, they do not. In this thesis, I do not wish to argue whether there is a 
relationship between the proportion of the independent directors in the board and 
corporate value and performance. The major purpose is to concentrate on how to 
make independent directors more effective in reality through enhancing their 
independence. This thesis will try to discuss the elements contributing to their 
independence and set up a framework in which the directors can maintain their 
independence and perform better. These elements include the substantial ones such as 
the definition and the role of independent directors, as well as the procedural ones 
such as the appointment and the remuneration of independent directors, etc, which 
would comprehensively influence the independence of directors. I shall refer to 
regulations in various jurisdictions while putting emphasis on those in the U.K. 
On the other hand, China, in order to cure the malfunction of its supervisory board, 
has brought in from the common law countries the concept of independent directors, 
which has led to the combination of two supervising mechanisms from both common 
law and civil law systems, which are the supervisory board and independent directors 
respectively. However, independent directors seem useless in Chinese practice at 
present. I hope the comments and recommendations in this thesis will help realize the 
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value of independent directors, and hence benefit the profound corporate reforms in 
China.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Section I. The global economic background  
This is an era of globalization, particularly in the field of business. In such circumstances, 
all sorts of economic factors, including capital, products, service, management, etc, are 
able to flow freely around most parts of the world. Since capital is the most important 
fuel to the economic boom, almost all the countries, including the super economic power 
- the United States - are craving for as much capital as possible. Meanwhile, the degree to 
which companies observe the principles of good corporate governance has become an 
increasingly important element when people make investment decisions1.  
As a result, in order to attract more foreign capital to supplement the domestic shortage, 
most of the countries have put the focus of rules and regulations on listed companies, in 
particular on whether the corporate governance system possesses relative competitive 
advantages2. Otherwise, these investors would lose their confidence and draw the money 
back, and the national economy would hence suffer great stagnation because of the 
depressed capital market. Taking Singapore as an example, as one of the countries 
benefiting from international commercial activities, it clearly realizes the fact that 
investors, especially international institutional investors, demand higher and higher 
corporate governance standards in companies in which they make investments3. In fact, 
there are more and more investors who have already taken corporate governance situation 
of the company into consideration when they make investment decisions4. Therefore, 
                                                        
1 OCED Corporate Governance Principles 2004, Preamble 
2 That is to best serve the interests of the investors, etc. 
3 Singapore Code of Corporate Governance, Introduction 3 
4 Ibid, Introduction 4 
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Singapore has set up high standards corporate governance in order to satisfy the needs of 
international business. Other countries who want to attract foreign capital are all making 
efforts to improve their corporate governance standards.  
Section II. The modern company vehicle and the problem of “agency costs” 
With economic globalization, the most popular and convenient business vehicle is the 
company which is famous for its separate legal personality and limited liability. However, 
as the modern company becomes more and more open and public, there emerges one of 
its greatest characteristics - the separation of ownership and control – through 
multiplication of owners5. It is described by Herman Edward S: 
With larger corporate size comes a greater dispersion of stock ownership, a steady 
reduction in the power and interest of the shareholder, and gradual enhancement of 
managerial authority, that is a separation of ownership from control6.  
This might be largely due to the modern business development and the consequent 
emergence of two groups of people. The first is those who own large sums of money and 
want to make profits out of the money through the most convenient company vehicle 
because of its limited liability, but without adequate knowledge or time to carry out the 
business. The other group is those who have sincere enthusiasm and specialized 
knowledge and skill to run the business, but without enough capital to make a start7. The 
modern company vehicle well integrates these two opposite kinds of needs in a single 
separate legal entity. The combination of the two groups of people has led to immense 
                                                        
5 Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1932, pp4 
6 Herman, ES, Corporate Control, Corporate Power, New York: Cambridge University, 1981, pp5  
7 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, A survey of corporate governance, The Journal of Finance, June 
1997, pp740 
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expansion in commerce.  
However, in such circumstances, since a large proportion of investors are likely to be too 
dispersed and too inexperienced to manage their business by themselves, they prefer to 
employ the salaried professional executives to operate the business on their behalf. As a 
result, it would inevitably result in the decrease in the control power of the investors, as 
well as the increase in the autonomous authority of the executives. The executives of a 
large company hence enjoy great managerial discretion.  
What makes things worse is that the investors and the executives belong to different 
interest groups in most circumstances. As Berle & Means described, the separation of 
ownership from control leads to the divergence of the interests of owners and of ultimate 
managers8. The shareholders probably employ some people they might not be familiar 
with at all to take care of their money. Even though the investors could select their 
acquaintances to undertake their business, these acquaintances, as independent 
individuals, have much incentive to develop their own interests at the expense of the 
interests of the investors9.  
The separation between ownership and control, together with the divergence in the 
interests between the owners and the controllers, contributes to the most predominant 
problem in the modern company – the “agency costs” problem. This problem is the latest 
and most typical issue concerning the modern corporate governance system. Hence it is 
the focus of the broad debate and the target of modern company law reform as well. 
                                                        
8 Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1932, pp6 
9 If the shareholders are too dispersed, even this situation rarely occurs because of the executives’ domination 
of the appointment procedure. Details see Section I, Chapter 7. 
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From a modern company perspective, “agency costs” mean the risk that is associated with 
having the owners’ property or affairs managed by the executives. It represents the 
conflict between the interests of the owners and the controllers of the company. 
According to the research by Jensen and Meckling, “agency costs” are comprised of10: 
(a) the monitoring expenditures by the principal; 
(b) the bonding expenditures by the agent; and  
(c) the residual loss. 
Eilis Ferran described “agency costs” in such a detailed way as “the costs of monitoring the 
executives, the costs of guaranteeing that the executives would act diligently and would 
not prefer their own interests to those of the investors, plus the residual risk that the 
managers will still act for their own benefit”11.  
The private interests of managers would significantly affect the company’s decision 
making. However, such self-serving incentive behind decision making is not so easily 
discovered12. It is likely to be complicated by numerous motivations, such as the business 
prosperity, etc. Since these motivations and the personal incentives of the managers 
would probably take effect simultaneously, some have argued that it is hard to tell apart 
the real influence of self-serving incentives on the management. However, in the study of 
Amir N. Licht, he chose the enactment of Israel’s dual listing legislation as a typical 
sample13. It provides a rare opportunity to preclude other motivations from being taken 
                                                        
10 Michael c. Jensen and Willian H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 3, Issue 4, 1976, pp308 
11 Eilis Ferran, Company Law & Corporate Finance, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp118  
12 Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1932, pp121 
13 Amir N. Licht, Managerial Opportunism and Foreign Listing: Some Direct Evidence, University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 22, 2001, p 341. 
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into consideration when it comes to the pure influence of managerial interests. It also 
isolates as much as possible the effect of managerial interests on the foreign listing 
decision, on corporate decision making in general, and on the drafting process of 
corporate governance, etc. Under such circumstances, he found direct evidence from the 
fact that the dual listing regime in Israel engages in a “race for the bottom” in which 
managerial opportunism plays an important role in the legislative process of corporate 
governance-related rules, let alone in the decision-making process in public companies14. 
We might conclude that the managers not only have their own interests in the operation of 
business, but also have great strength to impose their influence in the company and to 
snatch their personal interests at the expense of the company. The “agency costs” has 
                                                        
14 Before the adoption of “dual listing”, a lot of Israeli companies made listing in the U.S. because of the 
much lower requirements on foreign issuers concerning the disclosure duties, etc. However, some issuers 
argued that they made such listing for reasonable and legitimate motivations, e.g. to raise more equity capital, 
to increase the stock’s liquidity, and to establish an image of truly international firms, etc. These simultaneous 
existing motivations conceal the managerial opportunism. Fortunately, the development in the dual listing 
project reveals such managerial opportunism.  
Before recommendation of “dual listing” by the Brodett Committee (a committee nominated by Israel 
Securities Authority Chairman to do research in the feasibility and to draft the detailed rules on the dual 
listing), the regulatory situations concerning listing in U.S. and Israel are as follows: (1) The U.S. legal and 
accounting regime applicable to American issuers – based primarily on Form 10-K – is substantially 
equivalent to the Israeli one in terms of the investor protection it provides and therefore can be relied on for 
regulating dual listed securities; (2) The U.S. regime applicable to foreign issuers – based primarily on Form 
20-F – is inferior to the Israeli regime and the Form 10-K regime (e.g. Form 20-F permits foreign private 
issuers to disclose aggregate remuneration and aggregate options, unless the issuer discloses these data for 
individually named directors and offices; Form 20-F requires foreign issuers to disclose the names of persons 
known to them as owning more than ten percent of the issuer’s voting securities, and the total amount of 
voting securities owned by the officers and directors as a group, without naming them; in contrast, the 
threshold for U.S. issuers is five percent, and issuers must disclose individual holding of their officers and 
directors; etc.).  
The Committee strongly recommended requiring issuers to upgrade their reporting to the more demanding 
regime applicable to U.S. issuers which is suitable for investor protection in Israel and would prevent 
discrimination against local issuers.  
However, this recommendation was fiercely criticized and objected by business representatives and other 
potential issuers. They required relaxation of the Israeli disclosure regime, e.g. special disclosure 
requirements in a prospectus, timing of business results disclosure, immediate reporting of pending 
negotiations, disclosure about transactions with interested and controlling parties, etc.  Under the great 
pressure, the Minister of Finance finally ordered “maximum relaxation” in drafting the dual listing law. In 
2000, the Parliament adopted an agreed amendment that allows Israeli issuers listed on national U.S. markets 
to list their stocks on the TASE based entirely on disclosures they make overseas under U.S law or 
voluntarily.  
This rare case suggests that managerial interests probably played a significant role in foreign listing decisions, 
and in forming the final version of the Israeli dual listing law.  
For detailes, see: Amir N. Licht, Managerial Opportunism and Foreign Listing: Some Direct Evidence, 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 22, 2001, pp325-348 
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become a serious problem constraining the healthy development of the company and the 
successful realization of investors’ value.  
Section III. The origin of corporate governance 
Although the “agency costs” problem would bring great harm to the business community, 
people had not been shocked and begun to realize the severe consequences of the agency 
problem until the outbreak of a series of scandals in the United Kingdom in the late 1980s, 
such as Polly Peck, the Maxwell Group, Allied Lyons, etc15. The most shocking event in 
this series of scandals is that in 1995, the Bank of Barings collapsed after a British futures 
trader trading in the Singapore office under a false accounting reference committed the 
Bank to unlimited open foreign exchange losses16.  
Weakness in corporate governance has always been cited as an important contributory 
factor in the collapse of such a number of prominent enterprises. As Reggie Thein points 
out, “at the heart of the scandal is a failure of corporate governance”17. In order to 
identify what a failure of corporate governance means, we should first understand what 
constitutes good corporate governance. According to Fox and Heller’s definition, good 
corporate governance should ensure both that “the managers maximize the company’s 
residuals” and that “the companies distribute those residuals on a pro-rata basis to their 
shareholders”18. In other words, bad corporate governance is just failure by a company to 
meet one or both of the above conditions. Therefore, we could conclude that the above 
                                                        
15 See Richard Smerdon, A practical guide to corporate governance, 1998, London: Sweet & Maxwell, pp1 
16 Re Barings plc [1998] BCC 583 
17 Reggie Thein, Corporate Accounting Scandal, The Directors’ Bulletin, 2nd Quarter, 2002, pp2 
18 Merritt Fox & Michael Heller, Lesson From Fiascos in Russian Corporate Governance, Berkeley Olin 
Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper Series, No.1122, 1999 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/blewp/art123/  
In an investor owned company, maximizing the residuals is equivalent to maximizing shareholder values. 
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mentioned companies failed because they failed to distribute such residuals on a pro-rata 
basis, even though they could maximize the residuals. The management took advantages 
of their managerial dominance in the company to carry out diversion of claims or assets 
which originally belonged to the minority shareholders or the company itself. As a result, 
we could witness that “alongside this series of scandals was the rise of the ‘fat 
cats’—senior executives”19.  
Learning a bitter lesson from these company scandals, the business community as well as 
the state regulator shifted their attention to the importance of corporate governance. The 
sign of this change is the establishment of the Cadbury Committee, chaired by Sir Adrian 
Cadbury, to investigate and make recommendations on how to set up an effective 
framework of corporate governance. From then on, the expression of “corporate 
governance” became more and more popular worldwide.  
Section IV. The importance of corporate governance 
Corporate governance is “a set of mechanisms and methods which guide and control the 
operation of listed companies”20. From a micro perspective, a high quality of corporate 
governance would be a guarantee that the corporate assets would be utilized in the best 
interests of investors and other stakeholders, as well as that corporate value would be 
maximized. From a long-term macro perspective, a high quality of corporate governance 
would also raise investors’ confidence, thereby enhancing the stability and prosperity of 
                                                        
19 Richard Smerdon, supra, pp1 
20 Cadbury Report, §2.5. Although the rules on corporate governance are generally directed at listed 
companies, it is also encouraged that non-listed companies adopt such rules to improve performance. For 
example, the Cadbury Report encourages as many other companies as possible to apply the Code of Best 
Practice, which is directed to the listed companies. OECD Corporate Governance Guidelines 1999 asserts that 
although the principles focus on publicly traded companies, they might also be a useful tool to improve 
corporate governance in non-traded companies, such as privately held and state-owned enterprises. We can 
conclude that corporate governance is universally important to the management of companies. 
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the domestic and global capital markets.  
Bearing in mind the importance of corporate governance, people began to feel that a 
system of checks and balances among different constituencies in the company should be 
set up, particularly aiming to monitor the company executives and solve the “agency 
costs” problem. Unless some regulatory and supervisory mechanisms are brought in, 
there might be a lack of accountability on the part of powerful boards of directors and 
chief executives, which would be likely to result in the malfunction of the capital markets 
because the investors are scared away by these “fat cats”21. Since capital is as important 
to companies as fuel is to the economy, the recession of capital market would definitely 
imperil the ordinary operation of the national market, as well as the global market. 
Therefore, almost all the countries around the world make their own efforts, and develop 
their own supervisory models.  
 
                                                        
21 Supra. 
                                                                                   - 20 - 
Chapter 2 The review on the current supervisory mechanism 
Corporate governance is affected by the relationships among various participants in the 
governance system: the role of each participant and their interaction vary widely among 
different countries22 . Therefore, the model of corporate governance, especially the 
supervisory mechanism, differs from country to country. It is the result of the 
combination of various factors ranging from economic, commercial, social, cultural, to 
the historical background. However, in the process of economic globalization, the 
underlying rule of corporate governance seems to take on a symbol of convergence. 
There have formed several common ideas and basic principles. Generally speaking, there 
are two major different supervisory systems among the countries. 
Section I. The Anglo-American Model 
A. The unitary board and the independent directors 
Anglo-American countries often adopt the unitary board, in which the independent 
directors play a monitoring role. Some scholars also describe this model as the “outsider 
system of corporate governance”23. The expression “outsider system” refers to the typical 
characteristics of the listed company in the United States and the United Kingdom, which 
include dispersed shareholding and supervision from outside the company. Cook and 
Deakin characterize the model with an active market for corporate control where 
shareholders exercise control over management discretion through exit, which established 
                                                        
22 OCED Corporate Governance Principles 2004, Preamble 
23 E.g. Jennifer Cook and Simon Deakin, Stakeholding and corporate governance: theory and evidence on 
economic performance, ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, 1999 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/nov2000/ch1nov.pdf
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the threat of hostile takeover24.  
However, this outsider control system seemed not to work well during the late 20th 
century, and in order to supervise the management more effectively, the concept of 
corporate governance and the positions of independent directors were brought into these 
countries. Under this corporate governance system, the general structure still takes on a 
unitary board with a single-line pattern (as in Table 1 below). The shareholders, as the 
owners of the company, select directors to constitute the board, which as a whole will 
lead and control the company. The board is comprised of both executive directors and 
independent directors, who will take the managerial and supervisory function respectively. 
As the Combined Code 2003 of the United Kingdom states, the board should include a 
balance of executive and non-executive director so that no individual or small group of 
individuals can dominate the board’s decision making25 . It is these non-executive 
directors that undertake the major supervisory function through their dominance in some 
key committees on the board. Nonetheless, they are still the directors and have the same 








                                                        
24 Ibid. 
25 Combined Code 2003, §1.A.3 
                                   Shareholders’ meetinth e ) 
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B. The increasing requirements on the quantum of independent directors on the 
board 
It is generally accepted that board composition is one of the principle aspects in terms of 
corporate governance. In order to achieve a better corporate governance structure, the 
companies in the Anglo-American system are more inclined to enhance a strongly 
independent element and to increase the proportion of the independent directors in the 
board. At the beginning of the 21st century, many countries declared new guidelines to 
increase the quantum of independent directors. 
1. The big jump from 1998 to 2003 in the United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, the Combined Code 1998 required that non-executive directors 
should comprise not less than one third of the board, and the majority of non-executive 
directors should be independent of management and free from any business or other 
relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of their independent 
judgment26. However, the Combined Code 2003 requires that at least half the board, 
including the chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined by the board 
to be independent27.  
We can see that a big jump has occurred in terms of the quantum of independent directors 
on the board. Strictly speaking, the Combined Code 1998 required only one sixth of the 
directors to be independent, while the Combined Code 2003 requires one half.  
                                                        
26 The Combined Code 1998, §A.3.1 & A.3.2 
However, the Higgs Committee conducted a review of this code, and the Higgs Report released in January 
2003 led to the Combined Code 2003, which has replaced the old code and come into effect for listed 
companies from the reporting years beginning on or after 1st November, 2003 
27 The Combined Code 2003, §A.3.2, this provision does not apply to smaller companies which are below the 
FTSE 350 throughout the year immediately prior to the reporting year.  
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2. The latest reform proposal in the United States 
In the United States, the NYSE listing standards used to require only three independent 
directors on each listed company’s board28. After the series of corporate scandals in the 
beginning of the 21st century, the Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards 
Committee recommended listed companies should have a majority of independent 
directors29. This recommendation was accepted by the New York Stock Exchange and 
filed with the Securities Exchange Commission on 16th, August, 200230.  
Boards always simultaneously serve both managerial and monitoring functions. The goal 
of these regulatory reforms was to make sure that both of the roles are appropriately 
carried out and balanced, and to avoid unnecessarily infringing on either legitimate role31. 
From the increasing independent element in the board, we can see that the 
Anglo-American countries attach great importance to the independent directors in the 
listed companies in order to improve the supervisory mechanism. 
B. The corporate governance framework in the United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom has, after continuous reviews and alterations, built up a relatively 
complete and satisfactory corporate governance system through a series of Codes and 
Reports. This framework is more stringent and highly developed than those in other 
European markets and elsewhere around the world32. Born out of the series of company 
scandals in the United Kingdom, the preliminary documents include the Cadbury Report 
                                                        
28 NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 303.01 (B) (2) (a) 
29 Proposal of Corporate Accountability and Listing Standard Committee, June 2002 
30 http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-47672.htm  
31 Cynthia A.Glassman, Board independence and the evolving role of directors,  
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch022004cag.htm  
32 Brian R. Cheffins, Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to Milan via Toronto, 
Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1999, pp5-6 
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(1992), the Greenbury Report (1995) and the Hampel Report (1998). In 1998, these three 
reports were consolidated into the Combined Code, otherwise known as the “Principles of 
Good Governance and Code of Best Practice”. In 2003, in the wake of the series of 
company scandals in the United States which could be attributed largely to the failure of 
the monitoring mechanism, the Higgs Committee was appointed to make 
recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of the independent directors. The 
Committee produced the Higgs Report, otherwise known as the “Review of the role and 
effectiveness of the non-executive directors”, leading to changes, and the outcome is a 
new, amended and consolidated code, which has already come into effect since 1st, 
November, 2003. This newly updated guideline on corporate governance is the Combined 
Code 2003. The relatively well-developed system of independent directors in the United 
Kingdom deserves reference from other countries, especially China, which is at the initial 
stage of its corporate governance reform. In this thesis, the regulations from the United 
Kingdom and its comments will be referred to frequently and discussed.  
C. The “comply or explain” principle and the “soft” law 
However, the latest Combined Code is merely an appendix to the Stock Exchange’s 
Listing Rules, and the Listing Rules do not oblige the listed companies to strictly comply 
with the principles set out in the Combined Code. Instead, these principles are merely 
recommendations or standards of best practice set out by the Code. A company is only 
required to either disclose to the shareholders in its annual report and its annual accounts 
whether the company has complied with these relevant principles, or to explain the 
non-compliance if there is any. If the reasons why the company does not comply with the 
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principles are sufficient, then the non-compliance can be justified. This is called the 
“comply or explain” approach.  
Hence, the essence of the corporate governance approach seems to lie in the disclosure 
rather than the compliance. This might be due to the purpose of the “comply or explain” 
approach, which is to ensure that the investors and others have adequate information 
about a listed company's corporate governance practices and make informed investment 
decisions accordingly. Another reason is the consideration of flexibility. The situations 
vary from company to company in their size, organizational structure, scope of business, 
manpower composition, internal culture, external relationship, etc. Under such 
complicated circumstances, it is impossible that one approach fits all the companies. 
Therefore, it is reasonably expected that a listed company will comply with the Code’s 
provisions in most circumstances, while the departure from the Code may be justified in 
particular circumstances 33 . As a result, the Combined Code does not have any 
independent legislative force or direct statutory backing.  
However, even without the compulsory power of enforcement, this “comply or explain” 
approach has been in operation for over ten years and the flexibility it offers has been 
widely welcomed both by company boards and by investors. Furthermore, since the 
commercial community is undergoing great changes from time to time, this kind of Code 
with its “soft” nature could enable people to respond quickly and make amendments 
consistently with changing circumstances. Otherwise, if the Combined Code were 
enacted as an Act, it would take a long time for Parliament to make alterations and 
                                                        
33 Supra, Preamble 4  
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consequently hamper flexibility. The Department of Trade of Industry (DTI) also gives its 
support to the current “soft” rules. After carrying out a fundamental review of the 
framework of core company law, it announced in a discussion paper released in 1998 that 
legislative reform concerning corporate governance could be expected to take place 
where experience shows that some legal underpinning is needed34. Nonetheless, it sees no 
hasty need for such legal underpinning. The British government does not intend to 
replace the use of best practice by legal rules, because the “soft” approach is seen to be 
working35.  
Section II. The German Model  
A. The dual board and the supervisory board 
Germany adopts the dual board, in which the supervisory board plays the monitoring role. 
In Germany, public companies are regarded as “institutions with personality, character 
and aspirations of their own and therefore are naturally perceived as social institutions 
with public responsibilities”36, contrary to the companies in the Anglo-American model, 
which are often regarded as private units. Therefore, the companies’ structure of internal 
and external interest groups is more intricate than that of the Anglo-American. Cook and 
Deakin describe the German Model as an “insider system of corporate governance”, 
which is characterized by cross shareholdings, cross representations of directorates, large 
investor involvement and concentrations of share ownership, as well as the safeguard of 
the interests of employees37. Different from the Anglo-American countries, German 
                                                        
34 DTI Report, Modern Company Law: The Strategic Framework, §1.16 
35 Ibid, note 3.7 
36 Richard Smerdon, A practical guide to corporate governance, pp7 
37 Jennifer Cook and Simon Deakin, Stakeholding and corporate governance: theory and evidence on 
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companies have the most distinctive aspect of their own, i.e. the existence of dominant 
shareholders. As noted by Ekkehart Boehmer, the German stock market is dominated by 
large shareholders who control about 47 percent of the market value of all the companies 
listed in Germany’s official markets, and about two thirds of the 47 percent is controlled 
by banks, industrial firms, holding companies and insurance companies38. Under such 
circumstances, the major supervision comes from inside of the company, including 
dominant shareholders, employee representatives, etc. These people comprise the 
separate supervisory board.  
The corporate governance structure in Germany takes on dual boards with a single line 
pattern (as in Table 2 below). The management board is derived from and responsible to 
the supervisory board. These two boards assume the managerial and the supervisory 
function respectively. As described in the German Corporate Governance Code39: 
     A dual board system is prescribed by law for German stock corporations. 
The Management Board is responsible for managing the enterprise. Its 
members are jointly accountable for the management of the enterprise…The 
Supervisory Board appoints, supervises and advises the members of the 
Management Board and is directly involved in decisions of fundamental 
importance to the enterprise…The members of the Supervisory Board are 
elected by the shareholders at the general meeting. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
economic performance, 1999 
38 Ekkehart Boehmer, Who controls German Corporations? Corporate Governance Regimes, edited by 
Mccahery, Moerland, Raaijmakers, and Benneboog, Oxford University Express, 2002, pp 283 
39 German Corporate Governance Code, §1. foreword 
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However the corporate structure in China has its own distinctiveness from that of 
Germany. It takes on a parallel-line pattern, under which the board of directors and the 
supervisory board are both elected by and therefore responsible to the shareholders’ 
meeting. Therefore, these two boards enjoy the same legal status in corporate structure, 
and have no subordinate relationship between them as that in Germany (As Table 3 
below). In this sense, the relationship between the supervisors and the directors in China 
is similar with that between the independent directors and their executive counterparts in 
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Therefore, the supervisory board in China is not as powerful as that in Germany. In China, 
the supervisory board has neither the right to appoint or remove the director and the 
senior manager, nor the right to decide their remuneration42.  
People may argue that in the Anglo-American system the independent directors who act 
as supervisors and the executive directors are also equal in legal status. However, when it 
comes to the problem of independence, the supervisory board in China does not have that 
kind of independence either43 . China has its particular shareholding structure, i.e. 
dominant state-owned shareholding and state-owned corporate shareholding44. As the 
dominant shareholder, it actually enjoys the ownership, the management, and the 
supervision as a whole by administrative means45. In such circumstances, the directors 
and the supervisors are always selected by the State or under its administrative 
interference46, and therefore have the same purpose to serve the interests of the State. It is 
difficult for the supervisors to monitor the directors and protect the minority shareholders’ 
interests. The underlying extremism in protecting the State’s property is likely to 
undermine the independent judgment made by the members of the supervisory board. On 
the other hand, when it comes to the representatives from employees, they owe their 
employment and salary to the management; if they point out and shout at the mistakes 
made by the management, they are likely to have to look for a new job the next day after 
their brave show.  
In summary, the paradox might push the supervisory board in China into a dilemma. 
                                                        
42 Liu Lingzhi, Superposition and harmonization of the authority of the independent directors and the 
supervisory board, Contemporary Legal Science, Issue 3, 2002, pp100 
43 Wang Rui, Regulation on independence of the independent directors, Management Research, Issue 4, 2003, 
pp14 
44 Such shareholding is due to the economic transformation: many modern companies in China are 
transformed from the former state-owned companies under the planning-orientated economy. This kind of 
shares is not entitled to be transferred freely in the public under the current regulations, except for the 
lump-sum transfer authorized by the Securities Regulatory Committee.  
45 Jiao Jian, The choice of independence directors, supervisory board, and other modern company monitoring 
mechanism, Contemporary Legal Science, Issue 2, 2002, pp61 
46 Ibid, pp61 
For example, in the random investigation on 257 companies listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange, the 
proportion of the directors selected by state share reaches almost 70%. See at:  
Fu Dahong & Xu Min, On independence of independent directors in China from three aspects, Modern 
Management Science, Issue 7, 2004, pp109 
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Therefore, dominance or independence, the supervisors should have at least one of these 
two features; of course, it is better to have both of them. However it is unfortunate that 
the corporate supervisors in China have none of them. Without dominance as the 
supervisory board in Germany, or independence as the independent directors in the 
Anglo-American model, it is impossible to expect that the supervisory board in China can 
fully play its monitoring function. As a result, it does not have enough substantive power 
to carry out the monitoring function; some reference from other monitoring mechanisms 
should better be made in order to improve the current supervisory capacity47.  
C. The current corporate governance structure: 
In order to set up an effective supervisory system, China has brought in from the common 
law countries the independent directors system as a remedy in recent years. Under the 
new system, the board is divided into two groups of people, the executive directors and 
the independent directors respectively. The independent directors, together with the 
supervisory board, carry out the supervisory function. However, like many debates about 
“legal borrowings”, we are not sure whether this new system from a totally different legal 
family is compatible with the existing system. The result would lie in the practice. Since 
the independent directors are still at the beginning stage in China, we need time to make 
adjustments and finally come to the conclusion about the utility of such a “borrowing”. 
1. The preliminary stage  
The initial step in China to bring in independent directors is the enactment of “Guideline 
for the articles of association of listed companies”48 by the Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Committee (referred to as CSRC hereinafter) on 16th, December, 1997.  
However, as an attempt, the exegesis of this Guideline only claims the independent 
directors’ clause as a permissive one, rather than a mandatory one or at least presumptive 
                                                        
47 Zhu Lan Ping, Independence – The Fundamental Factor to A Independent Director, 2002, at:  
http://www.e521.com/ztjj/duli/600003/0128105039.htm  
48 The whole Chinese version can be found at http://www.chinaacc.com/fagui/zjfg/30923112108.htm.  
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one49, requiring that the company may bring in independent directors depending on the 
need of the company50. It is this permissive nature of the independent directors’ clause 
that shows the doubt existing in the Chinese legislative and commercial community about 
the new system. Since the legal status of this claimed welfare-enhancing practice is in 
doubt, the company participants could simply opt in to take advantage of the enabling 
measures and then make use of the practice in question if the government enacts the 
permissive statutory provision authorizing the practice51. On the other hand, because of 
the unclear future of the application of such a practice, the company participants are 
entitled to ignore the whole practice as they wish, without either explanation or any other 
positive actions. Furthermore, the regulations concerning independent directors are too 
simple, only including the qualification criteria52, while leaving the stipulation of detailed 
rights and obligations to the Articles of Association of each company. It would to a large 
extent vest great discretion on the board of the companies which might undermine the 
utility of independent directors. 
Nonetheless, it is through this less-than-one-hundred-words provision that China took 
initiative in introducing independent directors to supplement the existing monitoring 
strength. And this clause indeed makes progress; it precludes the representatives of 
shareholders and employees from being independent directors and enhances the 
independence of this newly introduced category of supervisors. Therefore, we could 
reasonably expect the fulfillment of the supervisory function through the enhancement of 
the independence of the supervisory mechanism53.  
                                                        
49 Brain R. Cheffins classifies the legal rules into three basic categories in Chapter Five of his Company Law: 
theory, structure and operation (1997). They are permissive rules, presumptive rules, and mandatory rules 
respectively. Permissive rules do not apply automatically and only apply when those who may be affected 
choose to opt in. In my opinion, such rules have the least legal enforcement compared with the latter two. 
50 Supra, Article 112. 
51 Brain R. Cheffins, Company Law: theory, structure and operation, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp250 
52 The criteria are simple also. It precludes three kinds of people to be independent directors; they are: (1) the 
shareholders or the staff of the shareholders, (2) the staff of the company, including managers and employees; 
(3) people who have the relationship of interest with the associate or the management of the company. 
53 In China, the current supervisory mechanism consists of the supervisory board and the independent 
directors. Although the supervisory board remains as before which lacks dominance, the independent 
directors bring about independence to the supervisory mechanism which could therefore be more effective.  
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2. The developing stage 
The chronologically second but the most important regulation is “Guidelines for 
introducing independent directors to the board of directors of listed companies” (referred 
as the Guideline thereinafter), issued also by CSRC in 16th, August, 200154. The 
Guideline is a relatively complete and detailed regulation solely concerning independent 
directors in China, from qualification, appointment, responsibilities and rights, to 
remuneration, etc. It requires one third of the board to be independent55. Furthermore, it is 
comprised of a large proportion of mandatory provisions. Compared with the permissive 
clause in the “Guideline for the articles of association of listed companies”, it requires 
listed companies to introduce independent directors into their boards of directors56. This 
progress might be due to the fact that China has realized the importance of independent 
directors after 4 years’ practice and tried to acknowledge and strengthen their legal status 
through specialized regulation.  
The “Listed Corporate Governance Code” issued in 7th, January, 2002 further confirms it, 
but without significant alterations or improvement57.  
C. The mandatory regulation 
The above three regulations issued by CSRC all together constitute the legal framework 
of independent directors in China and facilitate their effective fulfillment of relative 
functions. Since this corporate governance framework makes reference to those in the 
Anglo-American countries to a large extent, they are similar in many basic principles. 
                                                        
54 The whole Chinese version can be found at: http://www.cas.ac.cn/html/Dir/2001/08/21/5860.htm; the 
English version can be found at:  
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/en/jsp/detail.jsp?infoid=1061947864100&type=CMS.STD  
55 Since the independent directors system is newly introduced and the talent reserve is not abundant, the 
CSRC made a transitional arrangement on the quantum of independent directors. The Guideline requires that 
by 30th June 2002, at least two members of the board shall be independent directors; and by 30th June 2003, at 
least one third of the board shall be independent. This is also a big jump as U.K. or U.S., although the final 
quantum requirement still lags far behind them. See Guidelines for introducing independent directors to the 
board of directors of listed companies, §I.3 
56 Guidelines for introducing independent directors to the board of directors of listed companies, §I 
57 The whole Chinese version can be found at:  
http://www.setc.gov.cn/qygg2001/setc_qygg2001_main0019.htm. Whereas China has its special shareholding 
structure, this code emphasizes that the mission of independent directors is to protect the legitimate interest of 
minority shareholders from infringement at the same time as to maintain the overall interest of the company 
(Article 50). This clause provides a clear direction for independent directors’ monitoring endeavor and helps 
to restrain the dominant shareholders from exceeding or abusing their authority. 
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However, the legal framework in China has one significant distinction that all the listed 
companies are required to act in accordance with the concerning regulations58. On the 
contrary, the “soft” law in the United Kingdom provides more leeway for the listed 
companies, which can either comply or explain the non-compliance. However, the 
mandatory nature of these compliance-orientated regulations is designed in accordance 
with the special conditions in China. There might be three points counting for this 
difference.  
First, after developments and adjustments over a ten-year period, the Anglo-American 
model has accumulated abundant experience as well as lessons, upon which it established 
a set of good principles and provisions. China has already realized their utility. When 
bringing in the independent directors system, China could bring in the whole set of 
maturing rules at the same time. What China needs is to make some minor amendments 
to integrate these rules into the existing system. Since the legal status and benefits of the 
independent directors are clear, China inclines to make all the listed companies follow 
these corporate governance rules in order to improve their performance.  
Second, since the topic of corporate governance is at the very beginning stage, most of 
the relative rules only set out the minimum requirements which lag far behind those in the 
United Kingdom59. These requirements are the lowest level of the guarantee of good 
corporate governance. Every listed company which wants to maintain stable and healthy 
development should follow these rules; otherwise, there might be great failure in the 
company operation. Therefore, it seems there is no sound reason why the company could 
not fulfill these minimum requirements. All the companies in China should act in 
accordance with them. 
Third, these compulsory requirements could also provide protection for the vulnerable 
investors in China. As we know, China is still undergoing the transition period of the 
                                                        
58 Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies, the note 
59 These minimum requirements cover a wide range, including the quorum of independent directors in the 
board, the establishment of committees under the board, etc. They will be discussed in detail in the following 
chapters.  
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economic reform in which the companies originally from the plan-orientated economy 
are developing towards being modern enterprises. During this period, the capital market 
is not as sufficiently self regulated and effective as the mature markets in the 
Anglo-American countries. It also lacks institutional investors, excluding the State and 
the state owned companies60. Meanwhile, there is a large proportion of dispersed 
shareholders, most of whom are not well-educated about commerce and securities. Hence 
even when provided detailed information on the corporate governance practice, they 
cannot make sufficiently informed judgments whether the explanation of the 
non-compliance is justifiable and whether the company has the potential to make profits 
from their investment. Furthermore, many incorporated State-owned enterprises tend to 
avoid the corporate governance requirements61 and choose to disclose the information for 
the sake of their economic benefits, such as veiling negative news, or issuing false news. 
Under these circumstances, mandatory compliance could better protect the interests of 
investors.  
Therefore, the discarding of the “comply or explain” principle might better suit the 
particular situation in China.  
Section IV. Conclusion 
From the comparison of the two major supervisory mechanisms in the world as well as 
the particular one in China, we could venture to conclude that independent directors are 
part of the supervisory mechanism. The role of independent directors is to monitor the 
company management and guarantee the shareholders’ interests. However, when it comes 
to the role of independent directors, there are still world-wide hot debates in the countries 
using such a supervisory mechanism. In the following Chapter, I want to discuss this 
                                                        
60 Wan Shui Lin & Zhang Yao Hui, The bubble in Chinese capital market and the construction of market 
credit, 2004, see at: http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2004-02-12/13612358.html  
61 Wang Wen Yeu, Corporate Governance in China and Taiwan, seminar, held on 28 January 2004 in Seminar 
Room1, Faculty of Law, NUS. 
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topic in greater detail, based on information mainly from the Anglo-American countries, 
and China. 
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Chapter 3 The role of the independent directors 
Section I. The status of the independent directors in the legal framework 
A. The status in the eye of the written law 
In company law, “directors” are defined as “any person occupying the position of director 
of a corporation by whatever name called”62. Therefore, company law merely sets out the 
general rights and duties for the board as a whole and makes no difference between the 
independent directors and the executive directors. Very often, company law stipulates that 
the business of the company shall be “managed by or under the direction of the 
directors”63. Since the duties stipulated by company law are equally applied to both the 
executive and the independent directors, it is difficult to draw a clear line between the 
role of independent directors and executive directors. This lack of clarity enables the 
independent directors to find a way to involve themselves in the strategic management as 
the executive directors.  
B. The status in the eye of the common law 
1. The fiduciary duty 
The second category of duties of directors is the fiduciary duties owed to the company. 
Fiduciary duties generally mean that a director owes a duty to the company to act in the 
best interests of the company or the shareholders as a whole64. Hence in detail: 
(a) He shall not use his position to obtain profits for himself or any third party at the 
expense of the company; 
                                                        
62 Singapore Companies Act 1985, section 4(1) 
63 E.g. Singapore Companies Act, Table A, Article 73. 
64 Walter Woon, Company Law, Singapore: FT Law & Tax Asia Pacific, 1997, second edition, pp266-275 
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(b) He shall not allow his duty as an officer to the company to conflict with his personal 
interests; 
(c) He shall not take advantage of an opportunity which arguably may belong to the 
company, and he shall not compete with the company in its business65. 
The definition shows that the fiduciary duties are negative duties which mean they do not 
require the directors to do something proactively. Conversely, they merely prohibit the 
directors from doing something which might imperil the company. Therefore, even if the 
independent directors have less time and less information, they could easily fulfill these 
duties. Both executive directors and independent directors are equally subject to fiduciary 
duties. 
2. The duty of care and skill 
(1) The “ordinary man” standard 
The third category of duties is the duty of care and skill, which is the most controversial 
one. A series of cases held that although the jobs and tasks between the executive 
directors and the independent directors are different, they bear the same duty of care, 
diligence and skill. For example, in Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd66, 
Neville J said that a director is not bound to take any definite part in the conduct of the 
company’s business, but so far as he does undertake it he must use the reasonable care an 
ordinary man might be expected to take in the same circumstances on his own behalf. 
This standard will not be lowered to accommodate any inadequacies in the person’s 
knowledge and experience, and it will be raised if he held special knowledge and 
                                                        
65 Robert W. Hamilton, The Law of Corporations, 4th edition, West Publishing Co. 1996, pp 398 
66 Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estate, Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 425 
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experience67.  
On the other hand, some cases show that this standard will be sensitive to different 
contexts.  
(2) A case study – Daniels v Anderson 
In Daniels v Anderson68, AWA Ltd imported goods into Australia. In 1985 it decided to 
make forward purchases of foreign currency to protect itself against losses from currency 
fluctuations. In 1986 and early 1987 it appeared to have made substantial profits from its 
foreign currency dealings whereas in reality it had made substantial losses. AWA and its 
management relied on one person (Koval) to control the foreign exchange dealing and 
had not set place any system of management or control. AWA’s auditors (DHS) were 
aware of the weakness in the system of management in this respect but failed to report 
this to the management, and eventually failed to report it to the board when it was clear 
that the management had failed to do so. AWA sued DHS for breach of contract and 
negligence. DHS alleged that AWA, by its management and board, was guilty of 
contributory negligence and that its chief executive (Hooke) and its non-executive 
directors were negligent in their duties towards the company and therefore jointly liable 
to contribute to AWA for the damage suffered.  
In this case, the majority of the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that Hooke, 
through his inertia in managing the company, was in negligent beach of his common law 
duties of care and skill owed to AWA. By contrast, the finding in the trial69 was affirmed 
                                                        
67 Lim Weng Kee v Public Prosecutor [2002] 4 SLR 327 
68 Daniels v Anderson (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 607 (New South Wales Court of Appeal) 
69 AWA Ltd v Daniels (1992) 9 A.C.S.R. 383 (Supreme Court of New South Wales – Commercial Division) 
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that the three non-executive directors of AWA were not in breach of their duties, though 
the majority of the court held that the non-executive directors, as an essential element of 
corporate governance rather than ornaments, bear some common law duties, and that they 
should acquire at least a rudimentary understanding of the business of the corporation so 
as to place themselves in a position to guide and monitor the management of the 
company.  
On the other hand, the court also admitted that the level of care and skill expected of a 
particular director will vary in accordance with the size and the activities of each 
particular company, as well as the skills and the expertise held out by the director upon 
his appointment. The “reasonable man” standard which is applied to all directors would 
be varied in individual cases on the ground that what we can expect from a reasonable 
man might be different between the situations when such a man is an independent 
director and when such a man is an executive director.  
Further, these case law principles are further confirmed by the corporate governance 
regulation. The Combined Code 2003 gives guidance on liability of non-executive 
directors70:  
Although non-executive directors and executive directors have as board 
members the same legal duties and objectives, the time devoted to the 
company’s affairs is likely to be significantly less for a non-executive director 
than for an executive director and the detailed knowledge and experience of a 
company’s affairs that could reasonably be expected of a non-executive director 
will generally be less than for an executive director. These matters may be 
                                                        
70 The Combined Code 2003, Schedule B 
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relevant in assessing the knowledge, skill and experience which may reasonably 
be expected of a non-executive director and therefore the care, skill and 
diligence that a non-executive director may be expected to exercise.”  
(3) A case study - Lu Jia Hao v CSRC 
In China, such a divergence in the duty of care and skill also exists. The court will take 
into consideration various factors such as time commitment, information disadvantages, 
etc, and lower the standard of care and skill towards the independent directors. However, 
since China has neither clarified the duties of independent directors in the statutory 
provisions, nor developed common law principles as the United Kingdom concerning the 
standards of the responsibilities, the independent directors are relatively vulnerable to the 
litigation against them.  
One of the typical examples is Lu Jiahao, famous for his litigation against the CSRC71. Lu 
Jiahao became an independent director of a company called Bai Wen Shareholding Co. 
Ltd. after he had retired from a university as a foreign language professor. Because of the 
fraudulence in accounting records, all the senior executives including the independent 
directors were sentenced to punishment of various kinds. Instead of the criminal penalty 
against the executives, Lu Jiahao was sentenced to a fine of 100,000 RMB by CSRC72.  
Mr. Lu felt extremely aggrieved at this punishment because he claimed that he had no real 
power in the company and was kept in dark about the fraud73. Therefore, he brought an 
                                                        
71 See: http://www.chinanews.com.cn/2002-12-11/26/252436.html, this piece of news is about Chinese top 
ten useless independent directors in 2002, among whom Lu Jia Hao is one of them. Although this list is form 
non-governmental organizations, it is cynical enough to make people calm down to think about the situation 
of independent directors in China. After all, the independent directors are the “borrowing” and not every 
‘borrowing” is good and fit to China.   
72 This is just an administrative punishment, different in nature from that criminal conviction imposed on the 
former Chief Executive Director of Bai Wen.  
73 Wei Yahua, The first independent directors being punished in China, Chinese Lawyer, November 2002, 
pp28 
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action against the CSRC to revoke the punishment, but ended up with failure. This case 
gave a warning to independent directors, and made them think carefully before 
undertaking such a position. It resulted in many incumbent independent directors 
resigning from this position and many potential independent directors refusing job 
offers74. There seems no reason to blame them, because they could lose their good name 
over some accounting irregularity they failed without fraud to spot among the piles of 
documents or records. 
(4) Conclusion  
We could learn from the above two cases that there is divergence between the executive 
and non-executive directors in terms of the duty of care and skill. Although the United 
Kingdom company law does not recognize the non-executive directors as a different class 
of directors, it is increasingly being recognized that executive and non-executive directors 
play different roles. Some judges have accepted that the distinction should be taken into 
account75. Therefore, when the court is dealing with a case concerning the liability of a 
non-executive director, it will consider the specific situations of every company as well as 
the expectation on its non-executive directors, and then decide on a case-by-case basis.  
On the other hand, the companies are operating in a more “litigious, legislation-bound, 
and fast-moving business environment” than they were just years ago and the legal 
pressure on directors are correspondingly larger than they have been previously76. Lu 
Jiahao’s case teaches us another lesson that it is obvious that occupying the post of an 
                                                        
74 According to the incomplete statistics, there were 60 or more independent directors from 56 companies 
resigning. See at: http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zt/zt/120nian/200212300094.asp, also at:  
http://statics.homeway.com.cn/lbi-bin/news/create/article.pl?390588  
75 Cheffins B.R, Company Law: theory, structure, and operation, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp97 
76 Cheffins B.R, Company Law: theory, structure, and operation, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp614 
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independent directors is not merely one of status since there are heavy duties that must be 
preformed and consequent liabilities to be faced if the performance is found to be 
unsatisfactory. 
C. The status in the eye of the corporate governance rules 
The written companies act does not formulate the different roles between the independent 
directors and the executive directors. The common law seems to indicate that there exists 
a divergence to a certain extent. However, the verdicts are ambiguous and do not go 
deeply into this topic. The detailed regulations concerning the roles and responsibilities of 
independent directors are always shown in the corporate governance rules, such as the 
Combined Code 2003 in the United Kingdom, etc.  
1. The strategy viewpoint: 
Why do the countries around the world put more and more emphasis on independent 
directors? What on earth can they contribute to the company? When it comes to this 
problem, most corporate governance rules put more emphasis on the strategic functions. 
For example, the Cadbury Report asserts the independent directors should bring an 
independent judgment to bear on issues of strategy, performance, resources, including key 
appointments, and standards of conduct77. The Hampel Report confirms that independent 
directors are normally appointed to the board primarily for their contribution to the 
development of the company’s strategy78; etc.  
2. The intermediate viewpoint:  
The role of independent directors is frequently described as having two principal 
                                                        
77 Cadbury Report, §4.11 
78 Hampel Report, §3.8 
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components: monitoring executive activity and contributing to the development of 
strategy. The Higgs Report endeavors to strike a balance between them. It claims that 
there was no essential contradiction between the monitoring and the strategic aspects of 
the role of the non-executive directors79. It is no good overemphasizes either the 
monitoring or the strategic function. Therefore, the Higgs Report regards it as important 
to establish a spirit of partnership and mutual respect on the unitary board80.  
3. The monitoring viewpoint: 
There are some viewpoints supporting that the independent directors shall concentrate on 
their supervisory function, nonetheless only a few in this polarity. For example, the Law 
Commission, writing in September 1998, saw the role of non-executive directors from a 
totally different perspective as principally monitors81.  
D. Conclusion  
Although the independent directors are initially introduced to the listed companies as part 
of the supervisory mechanism from outside the companies, in the real world they are 
seldom regarded to assume sole monitoring roles. In this section, the ambiguous 
statement in the legal framework on this point is discussed as the main reason for the 
mixture of roles. I describe such a mixture as a confusion which is not a good 
phenomenon in the corporate governance practice.  
Section II. Argument for the unitary role of monitors 
Although both roles are legitimate in practice, the independent directors should, in my 
                                                        
79 Higgs Report, §6.1-6.2. 
80 Ibid, §6.3. 
81 Law Commission, Company Directors: Relating Conflicts of Interests and Formulating a Statement of 
Duties, London Stationery Office, 1998, §3.46 
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personal opinion, have a clearer role which concentrates on monitoring. The main reasons 
are as follows: 
A. A historical view on the purpose of independent directors 
We can see from history that the original purpose of introducing corporate governance 
and independent directors into the Anglo-American countries is to resolve the “agency 
costs” problem brought by the unfettered executives in the modern companies. In order to 
remedy this loophole inevitably existing in the modern companies, independent directors 
should effectively monitor the management and protect the interests of the real owners of 
the companies. If, as some commentators declare, it is repugnant for independent 
directors to be the shareholders’ watchdog, we see no need to divide the board into two 
groups of people and classify the directors as executive ones and independent ones. If all 
directors serve as executive ones, there comes the problem of who will supervise them; 
and we seem to learn no lesson from the history of disorder in the late 20th century 
because of the lack of a powerful supervisory mechanism.  
Therefore, many institutional investors and scholars assert that independent directors 
would be better as monitors. In September 1995, the City Group for Smaller Companies 
(CISCO) carried out a survey which showed that 43 percent of institutional shareholders 
considered that non-executive directors should be “policemen” on behalf of the 
shareholders82. The National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) has called on 
non-executive directors to be “whistleblowers in the corporate boardrooms when 
                                                        
82 Richard Smerdon: A Practice Guide to Corporate Governance, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1998, pp55 
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something goes wrong”83.  
B. The residual risk of managerial discretion 
In modern companies, there are two main mechanisms on the managerial discretion: the 
first is by market force and the second by legal force. The market force includes the 
managers’ incentive to keep their jobs, the market for corporate control, the constraints 
from the capital market, and incentive compensation policies, etc84. The legal force 
includes fiduciary duties, derivative action, voting rights, etc85. Before the system of 
independent directors was introduced into Anglo-American countries, these two 
mechanisms were widely used and proved efficient. However, after careful analysis, these 
methods for controlling managerial conflicts of interests are important but not perfect86. 
Being subject to market forces and legal rules, there was still the possibility that the 
executives would act in their personal interests and at the expense of their companies. 
Therefore, the companies are in great need of a professional group of supervisors, which 
resembles that of the supervisory board in Germany that appoints, supervises and advises 
the members of the management board87. And it is this function that separates the 
independent director from the executive directors. They hence would have an objective 
and impartial status in the board to investigate and point out when there are conflicts of 
interest. In a word, bearing the sole role of monitors, the independent directors would 
provide an extra guarantee against the residual risk of management discretion.  
                                                        
83 NEDs urged to be whistleblowers, http://www.accountancyage.com/News/1130481  
84 Eilis Ferran, Company Law & Corporate Finance, 1999, pp119-124 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 German Code of Corporate Governance, IV.2.1: the essential tasks of the Supervisory Board include the 
composition of, the control over and advice to the Management Board. 
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C. The potential undermining of the independence 
Furthermore, it has been argued that if the independent directors are involved in the 
strategic function, they may probably acquire a sense of cooperation and collective 
responsibility for strategy, which are likely to undermine their ability to make objective 
assessments of management performance88. Richard C. Nolan criticizes the wrong 
attitude the Higgs Committee takes towards the role of independent directors. He rejects 
the dual role of independent directors and recommends using them exclusively as 
“monitors and regulators of management, particularly as regulators of executive directors’ 
conflicts of interests, rather than as participants in management who also have a control 
function”89.  
The main reason he presents is that if the role is so widely extended as comprising the 
strategic and monitoring activities, it could easily “trespass on the proper territory of 
executive directors” and affect independent directors’ monitoring function. Working in 
the same board has already set up a potential element undermining the independence 
because of the collegiality.  
Another reason might be the independent directors’ unconscious ignorance of one of the 
two roles they take concurrently. There is some evidence that independent directors are 
fully aware of their strategic role but less of the importance of the monitoring one90. 
Therefore, if the independent directors share part of the strategic function together with 
the executive directors, it would be very likely to lead to another potential element 
                                                        
88 DTI Report, Modern Company Law: Developing the Framework §3.136 
89 Richard C. Nolan, The legal control of directors’ conflicts of interest in the UK: non-executive directors 
following the Higgs Report, course material of Comparative Corporate Governance of NUS Law School, 
2003-2004, taught by visiting professor Richard C. Nolan 
90 DTI Report, Modern Company Law: Developing the Framework §3.134 
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undermining the independence.  
D. Ineffectiveness stemming from heavy workload 
The board has a dual function, both to “lead and to control the company”91, and it is 
collectively responsible for promoting the success of the company by directing and 
supervising the company’s affairs. However, for the independent directors, “controlling” 
means not only monitoring the company management as other executive directors, but 
also monitoring the performance of the company’s executive directors. The reason is 
simply that the executive directors cannot effectively monitor themselves from both a 
theoretical and empirical perspective and there are no persons but the independent 
directors that can effectively monitor them.  
Some commentators argue that “in few areas of business is the gap between the theory 
and practice so frighteningly wide as in the role of independent directors”92: Legally they 
are no different from other directors, being equally responsible for the board’s strategy, 
decisions and actions with their executive colleagues; yet “they are being thrust into an 
ever-larger role in corporate governance, and expected to blow the whistle when or 
preferably before things go wrong”93. Therefore, it is important for independent directors 
to have an understanding of the general principles governing the legal position of all 
directors, before focusing on matters which may be of particular interest to them. 
Therefore, the independent director should not involve themselves in the strategic 
performance, because they have to play a monitoring role which is a tough and 
                                                        
91 Cadbury Report, §4.1 
92 Tom Lester, Expected to Blow the Whistle, at: http://specials.ft.com/directorschair/FT37YDLMYIC.html  
93 Ibid. 
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high-demanding mission. Otherwise, they will be over burdened by the heavy workload, 
taking their limited time and commitment into account.  
F. Conclusion 
Although the corporate governance rules often vested on the independent directors 
various functions, people have begun to realize the importance and feasibility of 
concentrating on the monitoring role. Four arguments are presented in this section to 
justify the viewpoint, including: 
(a) The historical purpose of the independent directors; 
(b) The residual risk of managerial discretion; 
(c) The potential undermining of the independence; 
(d) The overburden imposed on the independent directors.  
Under such circumstances, the independent directors should be positioned to monitor the 
management and performance of the company. Therefore, the corporate governance shall 
avoid the confusion of the role of the independent directors and make a clearer statement 
on this point, in order to facilitate the effectiveness of the independent directors in the 
monitoring function and the corporate governance.  
Section III. How to resolve the confusion and improve the effectiveness of monitoring 
role 
When looking into the written law, the common law, and the corporate governance rules 
as well, people might find themselves confused about such fundamental questions as 
what role the independent directors should play, and what duties they should assume, 
compared with the executive directors. Such a confusion and ambiguity might undermine 
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their independence and effectiveness. Therefore, efforts should be made to specify 
provisions concerning the role and the duties of independent directors and executive 
directors respectively. 
It would be better to limit the role of independent directors to monitoring. Unfortunately, 
it seems that the view of a mix of roles is more overwhelming world-wide. Under such 
circumstances, at least, the monitoring responsibility of the independent directors should 
be clarified in the corporate governance rules94. Only if the detailed responsibilities 
concerning each role are enumerated clearly, the independent directors could be expected 
to enhance the effectiveness of the monitoring role.  
Some commentators might argue that the general statement about the duties and 
responsibilities enjoy the flexibility, and would facilitate the directors to fully play their 
potential. However, it is unfortunate that a large proportion of company directors were 
not clear about their general duties in the United Kingdom95, let alone the independent 
directors. The survey shows very strong support for a restatement of directors’ duties and 
its inclusion in the Companies Act96. In the United States, the Corporate Accountability 
and Listing Standards Committee recommended that the directors’ responsibility should 
clearly articulate what is expected from a director, including basic duties and 
responsibilities with respect to attendance at board meetings and advance review of 
meeting materials97. For example, in China, it is stipulated that if the independent director 
                                                        
94 DTI, Modern Company Law: Developing the Framework, §3.143. It opposes to lay down in legislation a 
distinct monitoring function to be performed by the non-executive directors, being afraid of that this could 
lead to their role being focused on monitoring and to establishment of de facto two-tier system. 
95 Good Boardroom Practice, a survey conducted by IoD, see from DTI Report, Modern Company Law: 
Developing the Framework, §3.14 
96 Ibid. 
97 Proposal of Corporate Accountability and Listing Standard Committee, June 2002 
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fails to attend the board meeting in person for three consecutive times, the board of 
directors may request the shareholders’ meeting to replace the director.98 The more 
detailed the statement of responsibilities is, the more awareness the directors would have, 
and the more effectively they would perform. Therefore, the certainty might contribute 
more to the directors and the companies they serve. The directors could well protect their 
own interests only under the conditions that they know their rights and duties clearly. 
Only through this way, they could predict the outcome of their activities, and guide these 
business activities according to such prediction. 
In conclusion, in order to enhance the effectiveness and independence of the independent 
directors, we need the clarification and concentration of their monitoring roles. If it could 
not be achieved at the current stage, we at least should have a formal restatement 
specifying the detailed duties and responsibilities concerning each role of the independent 
directors. Therefore, the balance between the strategic and monitoring role would be kept 
which would benefit good performance of both roles. 
 
                                                        
98 The guidelines for Introducing independent directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies, IV.5 
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Chapter 4 The concept of independence 
Since the importance of the monitoring role of the independent directors is generally 
accepted, if they want to carry out the monitoring role effectively, the most important 
quality they should have is independence. In this chapter, the discussion is focused on the 
criteria of independence.  
Section I. The clarification of several similar concepts 
The importance of independence in the board has been acknowledged and strongly 
advocated since the early 1990s. Those people who could bring about such independence 
are variously referred to as “non-executive directors” (often accepted in the United 
Kingdom), “outside directors” (often accepted in the United States) and “independent 
directors”.  
In practice, these three terms are sometimes used interchangeably. However, there are still 
some potentially relevant differences99. The interchangeable usage is actually somewhat 
inaccurate since not all non-executive directors or outside directors are independent. The 
“non-executive directors” are defined as those “who are not a member of the management 
team”, and the “outside directors” as those “who are not currently employed by a 
company on a full time basis”100. The “independent directors” are those “who are 
independent of management and free from any business or other relationship which could 
materially interfere with the exercise of their independent judgment”101. Hence, the 
outsider director category is somewhat more restrictive in nature than the non-executive 
                                                        
99 Cheffins B.R, Company Law: theory, structure, and operation, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp97-98 
100 Ibid 
101 Cadbury Report §4.12 
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director category, and the independent director category is the most restrictive of these 
three categories. 
In the late 1980s, Baysinger and Butler advanced a method to divide the directors in the 
United States into three groups: inside directors, affiliated outside directors, and 
independent outside directors102. The Combined Code in the United Kingdom divides the 
non-executive directors into two groups, one of which is independent from the 
management and the other is not. Only the independent outside directors and the 
independent non-executive directors, collectively referred to as the independent directors, 
are the real target of this thesis.  
Section II. The definition of “independent directors” 
A. The infeasibility of the catch-all definition of “independence” 
Although it is generally admitted that independence is a crucial element of best practice 
in corporate governance, it seems that there is no direct and effective definition on what 
independence exactly means. For example, the Cadbury Committee suggests that apart 
from their director’s fees and shareholdings, the independent directors should be 
independent of the management and free from any business or other relationship which 
could materially interfere with the exercise of their independent judgment 103 . 
Unfortunately, we can see from such a catch-all definition that to some extent it is of no 
use because in the definition, it still uses the word “independent”. This is confusing and 
puzzling on the ground that the definition does not set out what “independent” exactly 
                                                        
102 Barry D. Baysinger, Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance 
Effects of Changes in Board Composition, Corporate Governance, 2000, edited by R.I. Tricker, Chapter 12,  
103 Cadbury Report §4.12 
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means. This is a definition which is not clear and feasible enough to be used for direct 
judgment on this point. As a result, it is for the board to decide in particular cases whether 
the definition is met104. This might be a potential element to undermine the independence 
of the directors since the management has great discretion on the independence 
determination. 
B. The complementary criteria concerning “independence” 
Many countries have realized the defect in this catch-all definition, and begun to use 
other methods to define the independence, that is to set out an extra list of detailed criteria. 
It has become a standard practice around the world. The following paragraphs would 
display the detailed criteria in several major jurisdictions. 
1. The United Kingdom 
The latest Combined Code 2003 sets a series of standards to preclude directors being 
independent if the director105:  
(a) has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years;  
(b) has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the 
company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a 
body that has such a relationship with company;  
(c) has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart from a 
director’s fee, participates in the company’s share option or a performance-related pay 
scheme, or is a member of the company’s pension scheme;  
(d) has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or senior 
                                                        
104 Ibid. 
105 The Combined Code, §A.3.1 
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employees;  
(e) holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through 
involvement in other companies or bodies;  
(f) represents a significant shareholder, or  
(g) has served on the board for more than more than nine years from the date of their first 
election. 
2. The United States: 
(1) The scandal year 2002 
To the United States, the year of 2002 was an extraordinary year. In addition to that 
typical case of the collapse of energy giant Enron and its auditor Arthur Anderson in 
Enron’s corporate accounting scandal106, there were a series of similarly serious events in 
some famous companies, such as Worldcom, Tyco, Merrill Lynch, etc107. 
(2) The new proposal on the “independence” standard 
American society was shocked and astonished. They wondered why the bitter history of 
                                                        
106 Anderson was one of the World Big Five accounting firms, but now there left only Big Four, they are 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, KPMG International, Ernst & Young. Even the 
existing ones cannot avoid involving in the corporate scandals. For example, KPMG International was 
investigated and accused by the SEC for its involvement in the Xerox accounting scandal and its partners 
were also charged by the SEC in connection with the audits of Xerox by allowing Xerox to manipulate its 
accounting practices and close a $3billion “gap” between its actual results and those reported to the public, 
from http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2707957.stm; Ernst & Young was charged of violating rules 
covering auditors’ independence, the SEC has said the accountant engaged in improper professional conduct 
when it joined forces with its client Peoplesoft to develop and market tax software, from 
http://new.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1999519.stm  
107 Worldcom, which admitted that it had inflated its profits by $7billion.  
Adephia Communications, which filed for bankruptcy on 25 June, 2002, and was facing investigation by SEC 
for misstating four year’s worth of profits, and finally negotiated a settlement with the SEC and received the 
largest ever fine penalty imposed by the SEC. 
Tyco, whose former Chief Executive Officer was charged in early June 2002 with avoiding $1million in New 
York State sales taxes on purchases of artwork worth $13million. 
Global Crossing, which filed for bankruptcy on 28 January and was questioned on whether there were any 
accounting irregularities; Qwest, which was under criminal investigation. 
Merrill Lynch, an investment bank, whose analysts were suspected of advising investors to buy stocks they 
secretly thought were worthless in order to secure lucrative deals.  
For details, see: Wall Street scandals at a glance, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2158557.stm  
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British corporate scandals in the late 1980s and early 1990s re-occurred in the United 
States just a few years after. It might probably be due to the failure in corporate 
governance, particularly the lack of independence in the boards of directors, because 
existing NYSE listing standards required only three independent directors on the board of 
each listed company108. Therefore, President Bush delivered a speech in Wall Street, 
calling for every effort to be made to cope with the malfunction of corporate governance, 
including more independent directors for firms, etc109.  
Under such a background, the Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee 
made a list of recommendations, one of which was to tighten the NYSE definition of 
“independent directors”; the detailed criteria as follows110: 
(a) no director who is former employee of the listed company can be “independent” until 
five years after the employment has ended;  
(b) no director who is, or in the past five years has been, affiliated with or employed by a 
(present or former) auditor of the company (or of an affiliate) can be “independent” until 
five years after the end of either the affiliation or the auditing relationship;  
(c) no director can be “independent” if he or she is, or in the past five years has been, part 
of an interlocking directorate in which an executive officer of the listed company serves 
on the compensation committee of another company that employs the director;  
(d) directors with immediate family members in the foregoing categories must likewise 
be subject to the five-year “cooling-off” provisions for purposes of determining 
                                                        
108 NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 303.01 (B)(2)(a) 
109 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2118162.stm  
110 Proposals of the NYSE Corporate Accountability and Listings Standards Committee dated June 6, 2002 
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“independence”. 
On August 1, 2002, the Board of Directors of the NYSE, based upon the above 
recommendations, approved new rules that would impose heightened corporate 
governance standards on domestic NYSE-listed companies through the implementation 
of additional listing requirements. The new rules, which have been approved by SEC on 
November 4th 2003, are codified in a new Section 303A of the NYSE’s Listed Company 
Manual. Unless a transition period is provided, a company must be in compliance with all 
of the requirements of Section 303A as of a company’s listing on the Exchange after 
October 31st 2004. These rules represent more detailed and complete standards for 
judgment on “independence”. In addition to the catch-all stipulation that the director 
should have no material relationship with the listed company (directly, or as a partner, 
shareholder or officer of an organization that has a relationship with the company), a set 
of criteria is listed, including111: 
(a) a director who receives, or whose immediate family member receives, more than 
$100,000 per year in direct compensation from the listed company, other than director 
and committee fees and pension or other forms of deferred compensation for prior service 
(provided such compensation is not contingent in any way on continued service), is 
presumed not to be independent until five years after he or she ceases to receive more 
than $100,000 per year in such compensation;  
(b) a director who is affiliated with or employed by, or whose immediate family member 
is affiliated with or employed in a professional capacity by, a present or former internal or 
                                                        
111 See at: http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-47672.htm  
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external auditor of the company is not "independent" until five years after the end of 
either the affiliation or the auditing relationship;  
(c) a director who is employed, or whose immediate family member is employed, as an 
executive officer of another company where any of the listed company's present 
executives serves on that company's compensation committee is not "independent" until 
five years after the end of such service or the employment relationship;  
(d) a director who is an executive officer or an employee, or whose immediate family 
member is an executive officer, of another company (A) that accounts for at least 2% or 
$1 million, whichever is greater, of the listed company's consolidated gross revenues, or 
(B) for which the listed company accounts for at least 2% or $1 million, whichever is 
greater, of such other company's consolidated gross revenues, in each case is not 
"independent" until five years after falling below such threshold. 
3. China 
(1) The regulatory standards on “independence” 
China prohibits a person from holding the position of independent director in any of the 
following circumstances112: 
(a) the person who holds a position in the listed company or its affiliated enterprises, and 
their direct relatives and major social relations;  
(b) the person who holds more than 1% of the outstanding shares of the listed company 
directly or indirectly, or the natural person shareholders of the 10 largest shareholders of 
the listed company, or such shareholder’s direct relative;  
                                                        
112 The guidelines for introducing independent directors to the board of directors of listed companies, III 
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(c) the person who holds a position in a unit which holds more than 5 % of the 
outstanding shares of the listed company directly or indirectly, or of the unit which ranks 
as one of the 5 largest shareholders of the listed company, or such employee’s direct 
relative;  
(d) the person meeting any of the three-above mentioned conditions in the immediate 
preceding year;  
(e) the person providing financial, legal or consulting services to the listed company or its 
subsidiaries;  
(f) the person stipulated in the articles of association; or 
(g) the person determined by the Chinese Security Regulation Commission.  
(2) Some comments on Chinese standards 
To a large extent, Chinese standards reflect the global common principles on this topic. 
However, they also have their own characteristics, including both advantages and 
disadvantages.  
First, according to the footnote, the scope of such a term as “direct relatives and major 
social relations” seems much stricter than the term “close family ties” in the United 
Kingdom and “immediate family members” in the United States113. It precludes more 
people from being independent directors in the companies where their relatives are 
employed. Such a stricter provision has special meaning to China. Since China is a 
traditional family-orientated or clan-oriented country, the people within the same family 
                                                        
113 Direct relatives refer to their spouse, father, mother and children etc; major social relationship refer to their 
brothers, sisters, father-in-law, mother-in-law, daughter-in-law, son-in-law, spouse of their brothers, sisters, 
and their spouse’s brothers and sisters, etc. 
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or the same clan are more intimate than elsewhere in the world114. Therefore, the 
influence such people could impose is more powerful than elsewhere accordingly. It is 
necessary to diminish this possibility of undermining the independence.  
Second, the clause (a) needs to be tightened further. It only precludes the persons who 
hold a position currently or in the immediate preceding year in the company from 
becoming its independent directors. The independence of such an independent director 
would be critically questionable if he terminates his current job and accepts the offer to be 
an independent director in the same company one year afterwards. It would be better to 
have a longer interval between these two appointments. Such an interval is described as 
“cooling-off” period115 by the Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee. 
It suggests that five-years is an appropriate period to cool off any material relationship 
with the company that has originated from employment, and this suggestion was accepted 
by the New York Stock Exchange. The United Kingdom also has a similar provision and 
a five-year period is also set out116. Australia stipulates a shorter three-year period117. 
China should amend this loophole to further tighten the definition of “independence” by 
extending the “cooling-off” period from one year to a reasonably longer one. Given the 
shortage of potential independent directors, China might adopt a slightly looser 
requirement, such as a three-year “cooling-off” period which is similar to that in 
Australia.  
                                                        
114 Wang Li Hua & Zhang Fen Tian, The historical interaction of the ideas, the society and the families, at: 
http://ccsh.nankai.edu.cn/xslt/wanglh/wenxian/04.doc  
115 Proposals of the NYSE Corporate Accountability and Listings Standards Committee dated June 6, 2002 
116 The Combined Code 2003, A.3.1 
117 Principle of good corporate governance and best practice recommendation, ASX Corporate Governance 
Council, Box 2.1 
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Third, the Chinese definition does not preclude the people who have business 
relationships with the company from being elected independent directors. These people 
would possibly attach importance to their own business profit, and therefore lose their 
independence. They should not be qualified as independent directors. 
C. Conclusion  
After listing and analyzing the definitions of “independent director” from three major 
jurisdictions, we can see that although the detailed expressions are more or less different, 
there are some common elements among the different jurisdictions in deciding the 
independence of the directors, including the employment relationship with the company, 
or its related companies, the commercial or professional relationship with the company, 
or its related companies, the personal relationship with the substantial shareholders, 
senior managers or the employees of the company or its related company, etc. These 
elements are also the most fundamental elements to ensure real independence. 
To give a detailed enumeration of criteria as supplementary to the catch-all definition, 
rather than a mere catch-all definition makes the independence judgment more detailed 
and practicable. It is important to ensure that the directors are really independent of any 
relationships that would undermine their objective judgment.  
Section III. Who should have a say in judging independence? 
No matter how detailed the criteria have been set up concerning the issue of 
“independence”, the corporate governance rules are generally inclined to leave the board 
as a whole to have the final say on whether the directors should be deemed as 
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independent. The same situation happens in the United Kingdom118, the United States119, 
as well as Australia120. 
These provisions give executives considerable leeway when assessing the independence 
of directors121. They might intentionally ignore the factors affecting the independence and 
select the ones unqualified. The common resolution to this problem is to disclose the 
result in the Annual Report and make it openly supervised and questioned122. 
China provides another way of constraining the executives’ discretion on this point. The 
board as a whole has the preliminary right to judge independence, while the CSRC have a 
final say to disqualify a particular person. This is a beneficial attempt to involve a third 
party in the “independence” judgment. In China, the CSRC, as the State securities 
regulatory body, has no direct power to nominate the independent directors. Nevertheless, 
in order to guarantee the independence of independent directors, it has the power to 
scrutinize the details of every candidate for the position of independent directors before 
being elected in the shareholders meeting. The Guideline provides that: 
Prior to convening the shareholders’ meeting for the election of independent 
directors, listed companies shall submit the relevant materials of the nominees 
to the CSRC, local offices of the CSRC in the areas where the company is 
located and the stock exchange where the company is listed…If the company’s 
board of directors raises objection to relevant conditions of the nominees, such 
opinion shall also be submitted in written123
                                                        
118 The Combined Code 2003, A.3.1 
119 NYSE Listed Company Manual 303A. 2(a) 
120 Principle of good corporate governance and best practice recommendation, ASX Corporate Governance 
Council, Recommendation 2.1 
121 Keith Walmsley, Non-executives under the microscope, 2002, see at:  
http://www.charteredsecretary.net/main/searchresults.php?id=404  
122 For example, the Combined Code 2003, A.3.1 
123 In this sense, the CSRC plays a role as appeal court which could hear the dissenting opinion from the 
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…Within fifteen working days, the CSRC shall examine the qualifications and 
independence of the nominated independent directors. If the nominee is 
objected by the CSRC, he or she can still be a candidate for director of the 
company but not independent director. At the general shareholders meeting 
where the independent directors are to be elected, the board of directors shall 
clarify whether the nominee has been objected by the CSRC”124.  
In other words, unlike the situation in the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Australia, where the board of directors as a whole should be the only one to have a say in 
whether the director is independent, there are two bodies that could make such judgment 
in China; they are the board of each company and the CSRC respectively.  
As mentioned above, it is a problem pending to be solved that the board is the only judge 
on the independence judgment. That the executives can determine whether the 
independent directors are independent from them inherently might bring in biased 
judgments and the result that directors who are not independent are treated as 
independent.   
On the other hand, if such a responsibility is shifted totally to a third party, such as CSRC 
or its equivalents, it might result in more problems and might therefore not be feasible. 
One reason might be that such a third party, as an authoritative securities regulator, has a 
broad range of significant functions and therefore could not guarantee enough staff and 
time to assume the detailed function of independence determination. The other reason, 
which I regard as more important, might be that such a third party, as a macro securities 
                                                                                                                                                       
board. It facilitates to prevent the board from being dominated by small group of people, especially the 
executives. As an impartial third party, its decisions are relatively fair and objective and able to show whether 
independent or not. 
124 Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies IV.3 
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regulator, is not able to probe deeply into the business of each particular company and 
acquire adequate information needed in the independence determination. In other words, 
it would not be capable to be the sole judge on this issue. Actually, this practice is widely 
rejected around the world. 
Taking both the merits and the demerits of these two practices into account, I am of the 
opinion that the Chinese provision is an intermediate one and practicable. On the one 
hand, the board of directors as a whole should make a preliminary determination on 
directors’ independence since the directors are familiar with the specific situation of the 
company as well as of the candidates for the independent directors. In this process, in 
order to secure that the candidates are really independent from the executives, the existing 
independent directors should play an important role and make an objective judgment. On 
the other hand, the CSRC should act as the last resort and make the final decision on this 
issue. We encourage the independent directors to play a positive role in the nomination 
process. However, there is a possibility that some of their opinions could not be accepted 
by the board. In the scenario of determining whether the directors are independent, if 
some independent directors regard the candidates as not independent, and their opinion 
could not prevail in the board and therefore be ignored, it is likely that the independence 
standard would be undermined. Under Chinese practice, these dissenting opinions should 
also be conveyed to the CSRC. The CSRC would have an opportunity to know the 
disputes on the independence judgment and make a final decision after careful 
investigation. Furthermore, such an investigation and final judgment arising from only a 
small number of dissenting opinions would not take much time and effort and overburden 
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the CSRC. 
Therefore, Chinese practice has provided a feasible method in solving the problem that 
the final say of the board in independence would lead to lower independence standard. I 
think it would significantly help to secure the independence of candidates who wish to be 
independent directors.  
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Chapter 5 Supervisory board v Independent committees 
Chapters 4 and 5 discussed two substantial aspects concerning the independence of 
independent directors. The former is about their role and responsibility, and the latter is 
about the concept of independence. In the following Chapters, some procedural aspects 
are discussed with the aim of enhancing their independence. I begin the discussion in this 
Chapter with the question of where the independent directors should be put so that they 
can fully play their role. 
Section I The supervisory board within the dual board system 
A. The arguments for the supervisory board 
There is some doubt about the unitary board on the ground that such a board could not 
provide efficient supervision. There might be two main reasons. First of all, the confusion 
of roles discussed above would more or less reduce the effectiveness of the monitoring. 
Another reason might be the independent directors’ lack of power and authority. It is 
possible that the degree of independence in unitary boards is compromised if executives 
dominate the board125. Some independent directors found out that they could not have 
their own mind prevailing in the board. When they raise an issue, they might be lucky 
when their executive colleagues agree with them, otherwise “they just forget it if they are 
the lone voice saying something unpalatable”126. The decision making process is a 
numbers game where all the directors within the unitary board have a right to play. The 
majority would win; however, the independent directors might probably have difficulties 
                                                        
125 Pitter W. Moerland, Complete Separation of Ownership and Control: The Structure-Regime and Other 
Defensive Mechanisms in the Netherlands, Corporate Governance Regimes, edited by Mccahery, Moerland, 
Raaijmakers, and Benneboog, Oxford University Express, 2002, pp291 
126 Prudence Leith OBE, Independence, Bunkum, 2002, see at:  
http://www.charteredsecretary.net/main/searchresults.php?id=289  
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in reaching such a majority.  
Furthermore, the independent directors are placed in an awkward predicament: they will 
be compelled to act as watch dogs of investors at the same time as their participation in 
the corporate decision–making leads them to identify themselves with management’s 
decision and to view the executive directors as colleagues127. What is worse, the unitary 
board facilitates their capture by the executive directors128. These problems might not be 
resolved within a unitary board structure129.  
Therefore, organizational independence seems important to the effectiveness of 
independent directors. Some people have recommended the establishment of supervisory 
boards to clarify the role and to give independent directors more power, and this has been 
adopted by many countries in the world. For example, in the Netherlands, there is a 
supervisory board which comprises only independent non-executive directors130. 
B. The arguments against the supervisory board 
However, although the dual board system could diminish the ambiguities concerning the 
status of the independent directors in the company and strengthen the monitoring function 
by formally separating supervisory and managerial roles, it is not totally free from 
problems.  
The main arguments against it include that the members from the supervisory board may 
have a poor understanding of the business and more limited access to information131. 
                                                        
127 Cheffins, B.R. Company Law: theory, structure and operation, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp623 
128 Paul L. Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, 7th edition, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2003, pp309-310 
129 Cheffins, B.R. Company Law: theory, structure and operation, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp623 
130 Pitter W. Moerland, Complete Separation of Ownership and Control: The Structure-Regime and Other 
Defensive Mechanisms in the Netherlands, Corporate Governance Regimes, pp288 
131 DTI, Modern Company Law: Developing the Framework, §3.140 
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Many scholars think that the cure might be worse than the problem. Therefore, countries 
having the unitary board seem reluctant to change their system radically. They want to 
retain their original supervisory system and gradually improve it instead of replacing it. 
The Cadbury Committee proposes to strengthen the unitary board system and increase its 
effectiveness, not to replace it132. Therefore, the board in the United Kingdom and the 
United States will continue to be a unitary structure. 
Section II. The independent committees within the unitary board system 
A. The successful compromise – independent committees  
1. Theoretical evidence  
Since the establishment of supervisory boards is too radical for most commonwealth 
countries, they have preferred to take one step backward, i.e. to establish independent 
committees under the unitary board to guarantee the organizational independence, 
particularly where there is a potential for conflicts of interests133. This is the bottom line 
which makes a lot of sense. The accusation against the unitary board of reducing the 
effectiveness of monitoring functions has been compromised by the establishment of 
committees under the Board. When it comes to the question which board structure is said 
to best provide the independent supervisors and best serve the interests of the company 
and the shareholders, Pieter W. Moerland asserts that the differences in degrees of 
independence between the unitary board and the dual board have become more and more 
shaded134. Just as some scholars suggest, independent directors can add value, but only if 
                                                        
132 Cadbury Report, §1.8 
133 OCED Corporate Governance Principles 2004, VI 4 
134 Pieter W. Moerland, Complete separation of ownership and control: the structure-regime and other 
defensive mechanisms in the Netherlands, Corporate Governance Regimes, pp 291 
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they are placed in a proper committee structure135. This would let independent directors 
perform the monitoring function that they are best suited for, while “letting inside and 
affiliated directors perform the informing and advising function which they bring more 
firm-specific expertise”136.  
The independent directors carry out the monitoring function mainly in three respects: the 
first is to ensure an internal control mechanism is in place; the second is to determine 
appropriate levels of remuneration policy and remuneration package of executive 
directors; and the third is to make recommendations on the appointment of new directors 
and senior management137. Many corporate governance codes state that the non-executive 
directors discharge these functions through committees under the board. These 
committees are usually the audit committee, remuneration committee and nomination 
committee respectively which are composed mainly or totally of independent directors138. 
In such circumstances, the executive directors are almost excluded from interfering in the 
affairs of the three committees, and the independent directors would have greater control 
and say in corporate governance.  
2. Empirical evidence  
The lessons from American corporate governance also indicate the importance of the 
sub-committees under the board since the series of scandals might be due to the fact that 
                                                        
135 Bhagat and Black, Board Independence and Long-term Firm Performance, Journal of Corporation Law, 
Volume 27, Issue 2, 2002, pp267 
136 Ibid 
137 Higgs Report, Suggested Code Provision, A.1.4 
138 Although there is some slight difference, that is a problem of degree, the underlying principle never 
changes. For example: The board should establish an audit committee of at least three…members, who 
should all be independent NED…The board should establish a remuneration committee of at least 
three…members, who should all be independent NEDs…A majority of members of the nomination 
committee should be independent NEDs (The Combined Code 2003, C.3.1, B.2.1, A.4.1).  
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the NYSE listing standards of the day did not require a nominating or governance 
committee and compensation committee. Therefore, in order to enhance the independence 
and monitoring effectiveness, the Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards 
Committee recommended that listed companies should have a nominating/corporate 
governance committee composed entirely of independent directors, and shall have a 
compensation committee composed entirely of independent directors 139 . This 
recommendation was accepted in the new proposals by the Board of Directors of the 
NYSE and approved by the SEC140.  
China is confronted with a similar problem. It neither requires the majority of 
independent directors on the board, nor makes the establishment of sub-committees a 
mandatory provision. What it has done is only to issue a permissive provision, i.e. the 
listed companies may establish the strategy, audit, nomination, remuneration and other 
specialized committees, according to the resolutions passed in the shareholders’ 
meeting141. The listed companies need not make explanations as the companies in 
Anglo-American system do when they do not comply with this provision. What is worse, 
with respect to the matters such as nomination or remuneration, the independent directors 
only have the right to provide the independent opinion to the board or to the shareholders’ 
meeting, rather than make the final decision142. This is probably an important reason why 
                                                        
139 See Report of the NYSE Corporate Accountability and Listings Standards Committee dated June 6, 2002, 
Recommendation 4,5,6 
140 NYSE Listed Company Manual 303A.4 & 5, http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-47672.htm  
141 Listed Companies Governance Code, Section 6, Article 52. The Chinese version of the complete Code is 
available at the website of the State Economic & Trade Commission of China:  
http://www.setc.gov.cn/qygg2001/setc_qygg2001_main0019.htm . 
142 Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies, VI 1: 
Apart from the powers vested by Part V of the Guideline, the independent director shall provide the 
independent opinion on the following matters: 
(a) nomination, appointment or replacement of directors; 
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the independent directors are of no use to a large extent in China. They are not placed in 
the right place to help them develop their potential. What China should do now is to learn 
from the lessons that the United States has just taken from the corporate scandals. Efforts 
have been made to give more weight to the role of the committees. The Shanghai 
Securities Exchange has enacted the drafting of its “Principles of Listed Corporate 
Governance” in November 2000, which requires that listed companies shall establish an 
audit committee 143 . However, further effort is expected to make compulsory the 
establishment of the nomination committee and the remuneration committee which are 
also important. 
Most commonwealth jurisdictions recommend the establishment of at least the audit 
committee, the nomination committee and the remuneration committee in the listed 
company. Some scholars even feel that these committees are not enough144. These 
minimum numbers of committees are there to perform certain designated roles; they are 
not there to ensure that all corporate governance and compliance requirements have been 
met. Therefore, the companies may set up a corporate governance committee, a risk 
management committee, a public policy committee or a litigation committee if necessary 
                                                                                                                                                       
(b) appointment or dismissal of senior managers; 
(c) remuneration for directors and senior managers; 
(d) any existing or new loan borrowed from the listed company by or other funds transfer made by the 
company’s shareholders, actual controllers or affiliated enterprises that exceeds RMB three million or 
5% of the company’s net assets audited recently, and whether the company has taken effective measures 
to collect the amount due; 
(e) events that the independent directors considers to be the interests of minority shareholders; 
(f) other matters stipulated by the Articles of Association. 
However, the independent opinion does not have the effect of enforcement, instead, the only effect is that if 
matters need to be disclosed, the listed company shall publish the opinion provided by the independent 
directors (the Guideline, VI 3). 
143 Principles of Listed Corporate Governance (draft), Article 17. However, it is still not compulsory to set up 
the remuneration committee and the nomination committee.  
http://www.sse.com.cn/ps/zhs/yjcb/magazine_content/2352/index.shtml, 
144 Kala Anandarajah, Corporate Governance – A New Beginning, The Directors’ Bulletin, 1st Quarter 2003, 
pp5 
                                                                                   - 72 - 
and permitted145.  
B. De Facto dual board – the practice in the United States  
In order to adhere to traditional practice, commonwealth countries have broadly rejected 
the adoption of a supervisory board. However, a similar outcome might be achieved in 
the unitary board. In the United States, many large companies have boards consisting of a 
clear majority of independent directors while day-to-day management is conducted by a 
separate “management board” led by the chief executive, or often the chairman146. 
Actually, the “management board” is not a separate board as that in the German system; it 
is the “executive committee”. The executive committee is usually composed of “inside 
directors who are officers or employees of the corporation (or at least are likely to be 
available upon call or upon short notice) to perform the managerial functions between 
meetings of the full board of directors”147. The division of labour of managing and 
monitoring between the executive committee and the other committees such as the 
nomination committee and the remuneration committee is perfectly legal and to have 
many advantages of the dual board, therefore, it is becoming increasingly common in the 
United States148.  
However, such a detailed division of labour under the board is a de facto dual board. 
Nonetheless, it could be an attempt for further division between the managers and the 
supervisors.  
Section III. Conclusion  
                                                        
145 Ibid. 
146 DTI, Modern Company Law: Developing the Framework, §3.139 
147 Robert W. Hamilton, The Law of Corporations, 4th edition, West Publishing Co. 1996, pp 264-265 
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Since the emphasis on the monitoring role of the independent directors has been claimed 
in the above chapter 3, it probably leads to the distinction within the unitary board 
between management and supervision that is to be found within the dual board system. 
Whether it is better to extend this functional distinction into a structural division between 
management and supervisory boards depends on whether one thinks that monitoring is 
carried out more effectively if the executives set strategy together with the monitor or 
separately from them 149 . Since most opinions stand against the adoption of the 
supervisory board and the dual board system because of its radical nature and inherent 
problems, many jurisdictions prefer to establish the independent committees under the 
unitary board for the independent directors to carry out specific monitoring functions. In 
any event, one might conclude that the monitoring functions performed by the 
independent committees within the one-tier board or the supervisory board within the 
two-tier board are not fundamentally different from each other, as long as they ensure the 
monitoring effectiveness150.  
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Chapter 6: Common problems with independent directors and possible 
solutions  
Section I. The alleged unsatisfactory performance by the independent directors 
A. The negative comments against the independent directors  
Even though the independent committees provide the structural guarantee to the 
effectiveness of the implementation of monitoring functions, the value of independent 
directors is still being widely challenged. Many empirical studies have come to a 
conclusion that they add no value.  
In the Untied States, there is no convincing evidence that companies with majority 
independent directors perform better than those without the majority of independent 
directors (Bhagat and Black (1999))151; there is neither evidence that companies with 
more independent directors would improve the profitability (Bhagat and Black (2000))152.  
In the United Kingdom, the non-executive directors are said to be even less effective than 
their US counterparts. There is little relation between the proportion of non-executive 
directors on the boards of firms and corporate performance suggesting little disciplinary 
role associated with non-executive directors (Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (2001))153. 
Even worse, they are ineffective at achieving management change in response to poor 
performance (Franks and Mayer (2000))154. In the 1995 survey carried out by CISCO, the 
data shows that only 12 percent of the companies being questioned view their 
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independent directors as policemen, while 45 percent only view them as “supporters”155. 
In Australia, Lawrence and Stapledon carried out an empirical study to show that 
improved corporate governance in terms of board composition would not on average have 
led to improved performance in large listed companies156. 
In China, many scholars describe independent directors as “beautiful vases”. Even some 
of the independent directors themselves admit their position is in dilemma157. 
B. The extremely high expectations and the need to cool down 
Why did the performance of independent directors around the world disappoint and 
frustrate the public so much? People feel very disappointed with the performance of the 
independent directors probably because people have had too much expectation and 
entrust too many responsibilities on the independent directors. They are regarded as a 
panacea to all the problems the companies suffered. They are expected not only to 
provide the company executives with support and guidance on business decisions, but 
also to monitor the executives and protect the company’s interests.  
However, the independent directors are not as almighty as expected. They have two 
important contributions exclusive to them; the first is “reviewing the performance of the 
board and of the executives”, and the other is “taking the lead where potential conflicts of 
interests arise”158.  
The OCED guidelines (1999) also admit that independent directors can bring an objective 
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view to the evaluation of the performance of the board and management, and can play an 
important role in areas where the interests of management, the company and the 
shareholders may diverge. For example, in situations where corporate performance is 
greatly sub-standard, the independent directors could seek to orchestrate the removal and 
replacement of key executives. B.R. Cheffins has pointed out that even though the 
independent directors’ function to monitor the management and reduce the agency costs 
might simply duplicate the effect of such mechanisms as the labor market, the capital 
market, the market for a company’s products and services and the market for corporate 
control, the management are still likely to have some leeway for acting in a self-serving 
fashion, and the independent directors could play an important role in redressing the 
problems this residual managerial slack poses159.  
The board should assign a sufficient number of independent directors capable of objective 
judgment to tasks where there is a potential conflict of interest160. If they could well 
perform such responsibilities, they should be regarded as valuable to corporate 
governance, no matter whether such removal or replacement have brought about any 
direct beneficial outcome such as increasing the share price or annual profits, etc. 
Evidence shows that firms with majority independent boards could perform better on 
particular tasks, such as replacing the CEO, yet worse in other tasks, leading to no net 
advantage in overall performance161. Michael Weisbach (1988) finds out that the boards 
in the United States, which comprised at least 60% of independent directors, are more 
                                                        
159 B.R. Cheffins, Company Law: theory, structure, and operation, 1997, pp607-608 
160 OCED Corporate Governance Principles 1999, Part V 
161 Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The uncertain relationship between board composition and firm 
performance, The Business Lawyer, Chicago, Volume 54, Issue 3, 1999, pp923 
                                                                                   - 77 - 
likely to act on behalf of shareholders and fire a poor-performing CEO compared to other 
boards, while the economic significance of these firings were small162. Byrd and Hickman 
(1992) find that there are higher bidder returns from tender offers if the board has a 
majority of independent directors 163 . Franks, Mayer & Renneboog (2001) regard 
independent directors as one party who can discipline management in poorly performing 
countries164. Helland and Sykuta (2003) find out that the probability that a firm becomes a 
defendant in securities litigation would decrease when the firm has higher proportion of 
outside directors165. These studies suggest that “independent directors, who are likely to 
know less about the company affairs than inside directors may react more proactively and 
quickly to replace a top executive if observable performance is poor”166.  
Therefore, the comment that the independent directors are of no value seems arbitrary and 
subjective. Actually, the independent directors are doing their best to improve corporate 
governance and indeed contributing something, even if these achievements are minor at 
present. People should not ignore such minor contributions because of their frustrated 
high expectations.  
Section II. Common problems and possible solutions  
It seems that independent directors are theoretically valuable if their roles are 
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1988, pp458 
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concentrated primarily on monitoring and the public should be objective to evaluate the 
independent directors’ contribution. However, there are still a number of factors in 
practice preventing independent directors from fulfilling their functions effectively, even 
the monitoring one. Hence, the corporate governance rules provide systematic regulations 
in order to overcome these disadvantages. This section will enumerate some popular 
problems followed by their existing remedies. 
A. Lack of available time  
1. Problem 
Lack of available time stemming from multiple directorships is a significant deterrent to 
effective monitoring. Corporate governance activists argue that effective monitoring 
requires time and effort while common sense dictates that a person, who is too stretched, 
doing many things at one time, will not be able to concentrate on promoting shareholders’ 
interests167. “Additional directorships may reduce an individual’s monitoring capability as 
their available time is spread thin”168, and make it impossible for the independent 
directors to keep a close eye on what is going on in each particular company. Institutional 
investors and shareholder activists have recently questioned the effectiveness of directors 
who serve on many boards. The National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) strongly 
believes that “independent directors need to spend more time with each company where 
they hold appointments if they are to add value”169.  
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Nonetheless, some scholars regard the number of directorships as a symbol of reputation, 
since the independent directors who have reputations as effective monitors would be 
employed by more companies 170 . Some argue that multiple directorships do not 
necessarily affect the performance by independent directors, and that multiple 
directorships do not necessarily impose negative influences on corporate performance171, 
which are contrary to the claims that multiple board appointments over-extend the 
directors and make the effective monitoring unlikely. It can be seen that multiple 
directorships are not a universal phenomenon among directors in the study which came to 
the above conclusion that multiple directorships bring no harm to the effectiveness. Table 
4 which is excerpted from the study data show that the super majority of directors being 
investigated (94.49%) hold no more than two directorships. Therefore, choosing an 
unrepresentative sample of companies might be the potential shortcoming that contributes 
to the failing to develop a sufficient and convincing analysis on the negative influence of 
multiple directorships. 
Table 4: Directors by Number of Directorships172  
Directorships held Number of Fraction of Fraction of total directorships
1 19,978 84.39 67.60
2 2.383 10.07 16.13
3 767 3.24 7.79 
4 351 1.48 4.75 
5 115 0.49 1.95                                                         
170 Kaplan, Steven & David Reishus, Outside Directorships and Corporate Performance, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 27, Issue 2, 1990, pp403 
171 Stephen P. Ferris, Murali Jagannathan, and A.C. Pritchard, Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by 
Directors With Multiple Board Appointments, Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, No. 3, 2003, pp1087-1112 
172 Ibid. pp1092 
                                                                                   - 80 - 
6 47 0.20 0.95 
7 17 0.07 0.40 
8 10 0.04 0.27 
9 3 0.01 0.09 
10 0 0.00 0.00 
11 2 0.01 0.07 
Total directors 23,673  
Total directorships 29,554  
Number of firms 3,190  
Furthermore, although seen from empirical studies that multiple directorships are not 
common in listed companies173, it does not necessarily mean that the independent 
directors exert most of their effort in these listed companies. They might take positions in 
other non-listed companies. For example, 20% of the independent directors in Singapore 
hold more than 10 directorships in other non-listed companies174.  
What is worse, “the raw number of board seats held might become negatively associated 
with a director’s monitoring capacity beyond a certain point, since they are more likely to 
turn gray or become inattentive or susceptible to cronyism”175.  
Therefore, the lack of time would probably become a serious problem without proper 
regulatory limitation. An independent director should be required to devote more time to 
a particular company; they should spend enough time to get into the details about the 
business. It does not mean to run the business, or to do the executives’ job, but to 
understand the business so they can effectively supervise the management.  
                                                        
173 See also David Yermack, Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors, 
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175 David Yermack, Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 59, No. 5, 2004, pp2299 
                                                                                   - 81 - 
However, many commonwealth countries do not have detailed regulations on this point, 
such as the Untied Kingdom. Although in the corporate governance regime, it requires 
independent directors to ensure enough time available to devote to the job176, it is far 
from clear without any prescribed upper limit upon the posts that independent directors 
can hold concurrently.  
2. Solution 
The most straight-forward and effective remedy might be to set an upper limit on multiple 
directorships. The United Kingdom prohibits a full time executive director taking on 
more than one non-executive directorship in a FTSE 100 company177. This provision 
could make but only minor improvement, rather than fundamentally solve this problem. 
The specified upper limit should be better set out. Directors are regarded as busy if they 
serve on three or more other boards when they are employed and six or more boards 
when they are retired178. In China, independent directors are allowed to hold concurrently 
the post of independent director in five listed companies at maximum 179 . Some 
commentators assert that even the concurrent commitments in five listed companies are 
too many for independent directors, let alone the possibility that they might take positions 
in non-listed companies or elsewhere. Commentators from the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
hold that serving as independent directors concurrently in five companies would possibly 
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undermine the effective fulfillment of their responsibilities 180 . A consultant from 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange recommends that two or three directorships are suitable181. The 
Table 4 above also implies that the upper limit should be no more than three, because 
under such circumstance, the corporate performance would not be affected.  
However, the widely adopted remedy is to require an adequate time commitment. On the 
one hand, upon appointment of a new independent director, the nomination committee 
should set out the expected time commitment in the letter of appointment182. On the other 
hand, when considering whether to receive this appointment, the independent director 
should take the time commitment into account and guarantee that they will have sufficient 
time to meet what is expected of them and to disclose their other significant commitments 
to the board before appointment183. Most countries adopt this remedy and do not set out 
an upper limit on multiple directorships as in China. Mr. Derek Higgs regards it an 
arbitrary and unrealistic to set a prescriptive limit for the number of non-executive 
directorships because of the variety of different appointments and individual 
circumstances184. The specific limitations might be less important than to ensure that 
members of the board enjoy legitimacy and confidence in the eyes of shareholders185. 
Therefore, full disclosure and reasonable justification are enough. 
In my opinion, the ideal model should combine both of the above remedies, particularly 
an upper limit. After the issue of the Higgs report, some commentators suggest that 
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possible changes that could be recommended in future include limiting the number of 
non-executive directorships one person can hold to five186. However, for the sake of the 
flexibility, it could be left to the nomination committee to decide the detailed limit on a 
case-by-case basis. For example, if an independent director serves in companies with 
similar businesses and in the vicinity, he could take four to five posts concurrently on the 
ground that it is easy for him to cope with each appointment; otherwise, if an independent 
director serves for companies with huge differences in background, it would be better to 
take less.   
B. Information inadequacy  
1. Problem 
Information inadequacy is partly due to the inadequate time commitment, and partly due 
to the fact that the executives would significantly control the flow of information that is 
necessary to the independent directors, and that the executives intend to keep the 
independent directors in the dark in order to avoid the effective supervision imposed on 
them. In a word, the independent directors have to rely so heavily on the information and 
resources provided by those whom they are monitoring.  
The law has provided some protective mechanisms for this kind of information reliance. 
For example, in the United States, the directors’ liabilities might be subject to the 
“reliance defenses”187, which is not recognized nowadays by all the states, though is 
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likely to be followed by most states in the future188. In the United Kingdom, the directors 
could also be, in the absence of grounds for suspicion, justified in trusting that officials 
perform their duties honestly189.  
On the one hand, such defenses will protect the independent directors from liability as 
long as they act in good faith and use due care and skill. The independent directors would 
hence become braver to participate in the managing and monitoring activities. On the 
other hand, such defense, plus the limited time, would possibly reduce the independent 
directors’ proactive attitude to take the initiative to probe into the company’s affairs. 
Therefore, more needs to be done to guarantee that the information is adequate and 
accurate enough to facilitate the independence and effectiveness of the directors. 
2. Solution  
In addition to the requirement that directors should take the initiative to seek clarification 
or amplification towards the information provided by the management where it is 
necessary190, a systematic framework is provided to support the necessary information 
flow to independent directors. 
The first support is that all new directors should be entitled to receive an induction on 
joining the board and consequent professional development191, which would facilitate 
them to get preliminary information and keep updated. The second one is from the 
chairman of the board, who should facilitate the effective contribution of non-executive 
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directors by ensuring “accurate, timely and clear information”192. The third is the support 
from the company secretary, who should ensure good information within the board and its 
committees and between senior management and the independent directors193. He should 
also be responsible for advising the board through the chairman on all governance 
matters194. The fourth is the external consultants from which the “independent directors 
could have access to independent professional advice at the company’s expense”195; and 
this measure will encourage the independent director to ask for external help if the 
insiders intend to keep them in the dark. The above provisions together weave a web to 
guarantee the information support, from both internal management and external 
professionals.  
The senior independent director should contribute his effort in this regard. The FRC 
Chairman Sir Bryan Nicholson declared that the Combined Code 2003 makes a big 
difference from the old version by putting more emphasis on the role of senior 
independent directors and setting out their responsibilities in detail 196 . The senior 
independent director plays an important role as a bridge between the company and the 
shareholders197 and as a leader among the independent directors being responsible for the 
performance evaluation of the chairman198. Since the information provided by the internal 
management might not be adequate, the senior independent directors could be one resort 
concerning information flow. If they could act as a bridge between the independent 
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directors and the company management, as well as a bridge among the independent 
directors, they would facilitate the independent directors to collect the information from 
the company and exchange information among themselves199.  
Furthermore, in terms of obtaining adequate information, the independent directors are 
encouraged to strive to develop “an informal information network” by dealing with other 
people in the company than their colleagues on the board, as well as the press, 
institutional shareholders, the company’s bankers, and the business contacts who are 
outsiders but with knowledge of the company200. The independent directors are also 
encouraged to have available some staff resources of their own, distinct from those 
working for the management, especially where potential conflicts with the interests of 
management are apparent201. 
In China, in order to ensure that the independent directors have the same right to be kept 
informed as other executive directors in the companies202, several channels are prescribed, 
including the company secretaries, other people concerned in the companies, and 
intermediary agencies203. However, it is unfortunate that there is no such position as 
senior independent directors. China should introduce senior independent directors into the 
corporate structure. This position is significantly important to the company on the ground 
that as part-time monitors, the independent directors lack communication among 
themselves and with the management and the shareholders. There should be one 
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independent director who can contribute a large amount of time to remedy such 
disadvantages.  
C. Collegiality within the board 
1. Problem 
Collegiality within the unitary board would probably undermine the independence of the 
independent directors. Considerations of collegiality and incentives towards mutually 
supportive behavior at board make it unlikely that the directors will sufficiently regulate 
each others’ conflicts of interests204. It is obvious that such a peer review among directors 
is far from enough since there must be “a spirit of partnership and mutual respect and 
trust” between all the directors in order to carry out the collective board functions205.  
In addition, it takes time for independent directors to understand the business. The longer 
the independent directors serve on the board, the more they know about the details of the 
business and the better they serve the company; however, the more likely that they would 
establish such a good relationship with executive management and such a good capacity 
on strategic contribution as to affect their independence. The independent directors are 
more effective monitors when they are relatively new to the company, while “they will 
become too close to the executive team and it is difficult for them to blow the whistle 
after they have served for more than three or six years”206.  
Furthermore, in the case of an independent director who is an executive director of 
another listed company, “their propensity to engage in effective monitoring may reflect 
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the level, which might be low, of monitoring that they would wish to see from 
independent directors on their own board”207. Therefore, they are inclined not to critically 
antagonize the executive directors.  
2. Solution 
Although all directors work within the unitary board, it still needs to draw a clear line 
between the supervisors and the supervisees when necessary.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the independent committees provide a good method. 
When it comes to how to keep the committees independent, there should be at least three 
guarantees. The first is that such committees are comprised largely of wholly independent 
directors. The second is that they have exclusive authority in particular issues and should 
not be interfered with by non-members. And the final is to secure the independence of the 
meeting of committees in which no one other than the committee chairman and the 
members are entitled to be present, but others may attend at the invitation of the 
committee in order to provide useful information and suggestions208.  
Another important method is to hold meetings of independent directors. The chairman 
should hold meetings with the non-executive directors without the management being 
present209. Further, the non-executive directors should, led by the senior independent 
director, meet without the chairman present at least annually to appraise the chairman’s 
performance and on such other occasions as are deemed appropriate210.  
The upper limit on the term of service might also help to sever the collegiality. The 
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independent directors would normally be expected to serve two terms of three years211. 
However, given the fact that long-term service helps the independent directors to 
accumulate necessary knowledge and skill to a particular company and the possibility that 
the independent directors could keep independence even after six years’ service in the 
board, it is a pity if a capable and objective director has to be removed from the board just 
because he reaches the limit of the term of service. In order to strike a balance, the more 
flexible clause is required. While serving for at most six years is a recommended standard 
practice, any term beyond six years is acceptable, as long as it is subject to particularly 
rigorous review212. The term beyond nine years should be subject to annual re-election213.  
It is unfortunate that China adopts neither the independent committees nor the 
independent meetings in the Guideline. This might be an important reason why the 
Chinese independent directors are regarded as ornamental and as adding no actual value. 
As recommended above, China should alter the permissive clause of establishing 
specialist committees into a mandatory one and introduce independent meetings to secure 
that the independent directors have some opportunities to meet on their own without 
interference from the executives. In respect of the term of the service, China has set a 
six-year term of service as the mandatory maximum standard214. This standard lacks 
flexibility and might keep many qualified persons away from being independent directors. 
It is a waste of talents under the current circumstance that there are not enough good 
independent directors in China. 
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D. Lack of dependence on shareholders 
1. Problem 
Independent directors may be relatively insufficient in monitoring the management 
because of the fact that “these independent directors are merely independent of the 
management, rather than dependent on shareholders”215. Since executive management is 
unlikely to easily accept supervision by the independent directors, the independent 
directors may have a battle to impose their will where there is a divergence of views. 
Unfortunately in average companies around the world, real independent directors are in 
the minority. Consequently, if executive directors act as a block, maybe with some 
independent directors who favour their opinions, they should be able to prevail if issues 
come to a vote at board meetings. However, if the independent directors can turn to the 
shareholders, particularly the institutional shareholders for support, they would have 
greater say in these aspects and carry out the functions more effectively. When it comes to 
crucial decisions of the company, the shareholders have the final say. It is note-worthy 
that this dependence on shareholders does not mean they are representatives of significant 
shareholders216, but dialogue and cooperation with them to monitor the executives.  
2. Solution 
(1) A win-win approach between the independent directors and the institutional 
investors 
Bearing the main purpose of protecting the shareholders’ interests in mind, the 
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communication between the shareholders and the guardians of their interests – the 
independent directors – is extremely important. The company should offer to major 
shareholders the opportunity to meet a new non-executive director, as well as offer to the 
non-executive directors the opportunity to attend meetings with major shareholders which 
non-executive directors should attend if requested by major shareholders217.  
However, the communication of such a degree might be not enough to unite the 
shareholders and independent directors to defend against the executives when there is a 
conflict of interests. In the United Kingdom, it is common for a company’s twenty-five 
largest institutional directors to own a majority of shares, which means “it will be easy to 
form a coalition which has voting power sufficient to get management’s attention”218. 
Once the independent directors have this kind of backing, the influence they produce is 
significant since all will know that “the institutional investors would likely have the 
leverage required to push through desired changes at a shareholders’ meeting”219. 
On the other hand, too much dependence on shareholders would undermine the capability 
to make independent judgments. Therefore, theoretically speaking, the shareholders or the 
representatives of the shareholders shall be excluded as candidates for independent 
directors since they themselves would be confronted with conflicts of interests and vote 
for their own interests. However, there is no such clear language as in Malaysia220, 
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Australia221 or China222 that is adopted to preclude a major shareholder from being 
independent directors in most jurisdictions. The shareholder who represents a significant 
percentage of the equity is the most useful ally that the independent directors can have223. 
Some Chinese scholars even suggest that in order to avoid that “independence” leads to 
“nil admirari”, the independent directors should be shareholders themselves224.  
The Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee introduced a compromise 
method, i.e. non-voting committee member. The committee asserts that a director who is 
determined as “independent”, but who also holds 20% or more of the company’s stock or 
who is associated with a holder of 20% or more of a company’s voting stock may serve as 
a committee member but may not chair the committee or participate in its votes225. It is 
believed that for such a director to be a non-voting committee member fairly balances the 
value of significant shareholder participation in committee discussion against the risk that 
significant shareholders may have interests diverging from those of other shareholders226. 
Such a non-voting member is introduced in the proposal only for the audit committee. 
However, it could also be applied to the nomination committee and the remuneration 
committee, if there is such a need as to make the committees more powerful against the 
executives, especially in the case of a deadlock between the executive directors and the 
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independent directors upon which the independent directors need to file a proposed 
solution for the shareholders’ meeting to make a final decision. If there is an independent 
director who himself is also a major shareholder or the representative of such a 
shareholder, he or she will be more influential than others and it is easy to make such a 
proposal and get the resolution passed through in the shareholders’ meeting.  
As well, since institutional investors have in recent years demonstrated an increased 
willingness to intervene when they are dissatisfied, they would rely on the independent 
directors to bring the message to the management and also to take necessary corrective 
measures. The institutional investors could cooperate with independent directors and play 
an important part for the sake of strengthening the power of independent directors against 
the executives. Relying on the company’s independent directors with their firm-related 
knowledge, the institutional investors could overcome the shortcoming that they are not 
familiar with the particulars of each company in their investment portfolio.  
This is a win-win approach that could lead to better understanding and coordination 
between the institutional investors and the independent directors. However, the 
independent directors should not rely totally on the institutional directors. The 
institutional directors are likely to act for their own benefit. Alternatively, they might not 
care too much about an individual company. The typical fund manager runs a portfolio 
which includes between 50 and 150 companies and looks at up to 100 new businesses a 
year for possible investment – therefore there are time constraints227. In a word, such 
reliance should not be unconditional and unlimited. Bearing the belief to work for the 
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best interests of the company in mind, the independent directors should have an overall 
view on the company affairs and take into account the interests of different constituencies. 
For example, shareholders, depending on their risk profiles, may prefer management to 
take up riskier projects but with higher returns rather than low risk low return projects 
because of one of the characteristics of modern companies – limited losses but unlimited 
gains228.  
In summary, although the independent directors are encouraged to turn to the institutional 
shareholders for help, such a resort itself is merely the tool, not the purpose. The 
independent directors must keep an unbiased view and act for the best interests of the 
company as a whole, in particular to be independent from the shareholder in case that 
such shareholder is involved in the conflict of interests. 
(2) Exception in China  
In China, the situation is quite the opposite; the independent directors should not only be 
independent from the management just as those in the United Kingdom and United States, 
but also be independent from the major shareholders, rather than dependent on them. The 
independent directors should be concerned with the interests of the company, especially 
protecting the interests of minority shareholder from being infringed229. The State being 
the major shareholder is very common in most Chinese companies. At present, more than 
half of the shares in the listed companies are owned by the state and the state-owned 
companies. Professor Wu Jinglian regards the shareholding structure as the most 
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important decisive factor to effectiveness of corporate governance230 . He finds an 
important -style relationship (as showed below) between them:  
       (X)                                                  
        0              (Y)  
 
* X represents the degree of effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanism; 
* Y represents the degree of concentration of the shareholdings of the company. 
Neither too dispersed shareholdings nor too concentrated shareholdings enhance the 
effectiveness of corporate governance. If the shareholdings are too dispersed, all 
shareholders are likely to be free riders, and this would undermine the effectiveness of 
supervision against the management; on the other hand, if the shareholdings are too 
concentrated, the dominant shareholders will interfere with the management for their own 
interests and at the expense of other shareholders. The ideal structure is the appropriately 
intermediate concentration. The United Kingdom and the United States, encourage the 
role of institutional investors to solve their problem of too dispersed shareholdings.  
By contrast, China is troubled with too concentrated shareholdings. In order to get out of 
this difficulty, China is undergoing the fiercest reform on shareholding structure, i.e. the 
reduction of state-owned shares. In this process, the lesson China must take from the 
fiascos in Russian corporate governance is to protect the interests of the minority 
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shareholders. As both the countries are undergoing transitions in their economies, 
attention has been focused on the problem relating to non pro-rata distributions, e.g. 
inside controllers dilute shares of the outsiders, etc231. In China, the insider controller, i.e. 
the state and its closely related management and the labor union, carry out reductions 
through the sale of shares which were originally owned by the state and could not be 
transferred freely. This measure helps to diminish the state’s controlling shareholding and 
benefit the major shareholders other than the state. However, it is unfortunate that the 
state often plays tricks in this process, in particular the assets evaluation process and the 
share pricing process232. Therefore, the value of the minorities’ shares is greatly diluted 
and their interests are imperiled. This outcome worries the public so much. Russia failed 
because the inside group viewed their shares as control rights rather than as financial 
instruments233. China is in a similar situation. The Chinese government exercises control 
over State-owned Enterprises in three capacities, including the property rights owner, the 
dominant shareholder, and the super-regulator, while the Taiwanese government primarily 
through shareholdings only234. It even claims that the ownership of the corporate property 
subscribed by the State belongs to the State235. This is nonsense according to the generally 
accepted principle of the corporation’s separate legal personality. Once the company is 
incorporated, it becomes a legal entity separate from its owners, managers, employees, 
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etc. Once a person sells or gives any property to a company, he has parted with his 
interest in that property; the property becomes the company’s, not his any longer236. 
However, under the Chinese practice, the value of each transferable share would be 
decreased after the reduction. In order to avoid the problem in Russia, China must pay 
more attention to the protection of the minority shareholders. The different roles the State 
plays as shareholder and regulator should be clarified. More importantly, law about 
recognition and enforcement of property rights with appropriate penalties for 
transgression is strongly suggested to be made by national legislature237.  
However, the exception is not absolute. China should also bring in the institutional 
investors which have no state background to hold similar shareholdings as the State238. In 
this case the independent directors could cooperate with them to protect the shareholders 
from being infringed by the insider controllers, and the minority from being infringed by 
the majority. 
Section III. Conclusion  
The problems mentioned in this chapter are some popular problems concerning the 
independence and effectiveness of independent directors. Effort is required to perfect the 
framework in which the independent directors can fully discharge their responsibility and 
therefore have true value in corporate governance. These existing solutions are not 
exhaustive. More efforts need to be exerted.  
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Furthermore, these problems are not exhaustive either. There are still some loopholes that 
deserve further consideration in two aspects, namely the appointment and the 
remuneration of independent directors. These two areas are the most important and 
influential factors concerning the independence of independent directors. However, the 
appointment and remuneration procedures are far from reasonable and systematic around 
the world. Countries have been making great efforts to improve these procedures. It is 
expected that the independence of independent directors would be greatly enhanced as 
long as these procedures are well established. In the following Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, I 
want to make a detailed analysis on the appointment and remuneration of independent 
directors respectively.  
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Chapter 7 The appointment of independent directors 
Section I. The problems in the appointment of independent directors  
When it comes to the election of independent directors in large listed companies, it is 
useful to distinguish the reality from the theory. In theory, individual directors are 
nominated by the nomination committee and ultimately elected by the shareholders at 
general meetings. The reality is quite different. The Companies Act generally leaves it to 
the articles of association to stipulate the detailed procedures concerning the appointment 
of new directors. Although the shareholders’ meeting has the final say in the selection of 
the independent directors, the executive directors and senior management, particularly the 
CEO, would enjoy great leeway to impose their personal will upon the appointment.  
A. Appointing directors directly when there is a casual vacancy 
Most companies’ articles of association allow the board to fill casual vacancies or to 
appoint additional directors. This is a fiduciary power and a director must act in the 
company’s interests when he attempts to procure the appointment of a co-director239, and 
the selected director must be subject to confirmation at the next annual general meeting. 
However, the board has the discretion to select an independent director of their favour, 
during the period at least from appointment to the next general meeting.  
B. Selecting the candidate they like through proxy in shareholders’ meetings 
On most occasions, since the shareholders are too dispersed and inexperienced, they vote 
by proxy. Only a small number of them actually attend and vote at the meetings in person. 
Therefore, the decision as to who is to be selected is probably not made by the vote taken 
                                                        
239 Walter Woon, Company Law, Singapore: FT Law & Tax Asia Pacific, 1997, second edition, pp225 
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at the shareholders meeting, but resolved some time earlier by the filing of proxy forms 
by the owners of shares on issues that are voted by proxy240. Although it is theoretically 
possible for some shareholders to solicit proxies in competition with management, which 
is described as “proxy fight”, it is quite unusual for any competing group to make a 
serious solicitation in an effort to elect a majority of the directors in opposition to 
management because of the substantial cost241. Therefore, the management is likely to 
win this fight and dominate the election at the shareholders’ meeting. In such 
circumstances, the independent directors selected would be inclined to follow the 
management to whom they owe their appointment. 
C. Giving advice in the nomination process  
In listed companies, shareholders’ voting on the election of directors is usually a 
formality since shareholders can only vote with respect to those candidates that have been 
nominated. In most circumstances “only one slate of candidates is offered”242. Therefore, 
who decides the slate becomes a key question. Although the independent nomination 
committee is set up, empirical studies show that individuals, such as the chairman or the 
CEO, continue to be involved and play an important role in selecting candidates243.  
First of all, in order to respect the rights of the executive directors to choose the 
colleagues and create a harmonious working environment, the corporate governance rules 
prefer a loose requirement on the proportion of independent directors in the nomination 
                                                        
240 R. W. Hamilton, The Law of Corporations, 4th edition, pp337 
241 Ibid, pp338, such a cost includes not only the monetary expenditure, but also in the US boring and costly 
compliance with the complex SEC proxy regulations in case of a solicitation of proxies from more than ten 
shareholders. 
242 Cheffins B.R, Company Law: theory, structure and operation, pp98 
243 Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: an empirical 
study, Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, No. 5, 1999, pp1851 
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committee244. Furthermore, not only the independent director, but also the chairman of the 
board could chair the committee245. These provisions might be interpreted as a sign of 
respect in the favor of the executive directors. Additionally, it is inevitable on some 
occasions for the committee to consult the executives who are not sitting on the 
committee when the committee could not make up a satisfactory list of candidates due to 
the limited resources within the committee. Therefore, the executive director and the 
management are likely to impose their influence through their peers in the committee.  
Secondly, since the nomination committee might not be well informed about the pool of 
independent directors, it probably would nominate some people with whom the 
committee members are familiar with. Therefore, the independent directors might be 
limited to friends, college-roommates, and the like. Using such personal contacts as the 
main source of candidates will favor those with similar backgrounds to the incumbent 
directors246. This would greatly undermine the diversity of independent directors and their 
independence. 
D. Conclusion 
The appointments of independent directors are likely to be interfered with by the 
executives and therefore cannot be undertaken objectively. Empirical studies show that 
independent directors are less likely to monitor aggressively when CEOs are involved in 
the appointment process247.  
                                                        
244 The New combined Code 2003 requires that the nomination committee should consist of a majority of 
independent directors (A.4.1), and do not need full composition of independent directors as remuneration 
committee (B.2.1) and audit committee (C.3.1).  
245 The Combined Code 2003§A.4.1 
246 Higgs Report, §10.24 
247 Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: an empirical 
study, Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, No. 5, 1999, pp1852 
                                                                                   - 102 - 
Although its bad effect has been offset to a large extent by the standard practice to split 
the CEO and the chairman and to establish an independent nomination committee, the 
objectivity in the appointment procedures is still far from assured 248 . Since the 
recruitment process has much to do with ensuring the independence of independent 
directors, there is broad consensus that this process should be assessed and improved. The 
Department of Trade and Industry in UK suggests changing the non-executive directors’ 
appointment method249, and in the last year specially issued the Tyson Report on the 
recruitment and development of non-executive directors250. This goal could be achieved 
from three aspects: the pool of independent directors, the nomination process and the 
election process.  
Section II. The pool of independent directors 
A. The popular candidates for independent directors at present   
At present, CEOs and former CEOs of other corporations are the most popular candidates 
for independent directorships because they have the practical experience and background 
necessary for them to provide useful and sophisticated advice251. This may be strength but 
may also be weakness, because the inertia of the mindset is likely to confuse the two 
positions they are taking concurrently and therefore make them too merciful and 
considerate on the executives to monitor effectively. The companies’ second choices are 
professionals such as accountants, lawyers and financial experts252. That the board favors 
                                                        
248 B.R. Cheffins, Company Law: theory, structure and operation (1997), pp609 
249 DTI, Modern Company Law: Developing the Framework, §3.143 
250 A report commissioned by the DTI in June 2003 following the publication of the Higgs Review of the 
Role and Effectiveness of Non-executive Directors in January 2003. 
251 R.W. Hamilton, The Law of Corporations, 4th edition, pp342 
252 Jay A. Conger & Edward Lawler, Building a High-Performing Board: How to Choose the Right Members, 
Business Strategy Review, 2001, Volume 12 Issue 3, pp12 
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people with accountancy, legal or financial backgrounds is understandable because the 
issues that concern independent directors are increasingly about risk management and 
accountability, other than business management. The lawyers and the accountants are of 
great importance because of their professional knowledge.  
Furthermore, the research conducted by Derek Higgs shows that the independent 
directors are typically white males nearing retirement age with previous directorship 
experience in a public company253. The women, the younger talents, the foreigners, the 
racial or ethic minorities are often kept away from the list of candidates254. Research also 
shows that almost half of the non-executive directors surveyed were recruited to their role 
through personal contacts or friendships; only four percent had had a formal interview; 
only one percent had obtained their job by answering an advertisement255.  
B. Calling for the board with great diversity 
However, the boards need a broader mix of skills, not only from business people, lawyers 
and accountants, but also from human resource experts, educators, etc. The diversity issue 
also goes “beyond gender, culture, religion, business school cliques, personality types 
plus individual thinking styles”256. Such diversity would definitely bring about great 
benefits. 
First, given today’s complex business situations, it is unrealistic to expect an individual 
director to be knowledgeable about every aspect concerning the business and to be 
                                                        
253 Higgs Report, §10.21 
254 According to Higgs Report, only six percent of non-executive posts are held by women (§10.22), only 
seven percent of non-executive directors are non-British nationals (§10.21), and only one percent are black 
and ethnic minority groups (§10.21). 
255 Higgs Report, §10.5 
256 Cabrielle O’ Donovan, Change Management – A Board Culture of Corporate Governance, Corporate 
Governance International, Volume 6, Issue 3, September 2003, pp32 
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available at all times to influence all decisions; the better approach hence is to make 
individuals contribute “different pieces to the total picture that it takes to create an 
effective board”257.  
Second, members with dissimilar backgrounds have different interests, values and skills 
that add to the information base and business perspectives, and such diversity is 
positively associated with public evaluation in respect of the effectiveness of the board258.  
Third, such diversity will send a positive signal to customers, shareholders and employees 
that the company’s leadership comprises diverse constituencies, and help the company to 
manage the relationship among key constituencies and with the public259. Hence, the 
company may benefit much in respect of their reputation260.  
On the other hand, diversity is not free from problems. Particularly, diversity usually 
leads to differences261. Therefore, large boards may encounter a number of barriers in 
reaching a consensus262. However, such disadvantages could be resolved by training and 
evaluation, etc263. Since the importance of diversity among the independent directors is 
generally realized, many commentators suggest introducing such diversity in board 
practice. The latest recommendation from DTI states that the qualities necessary for an 
effective contribution to the board can be acquired from a variety of backgrounds264.  
                                                        
257 Jay A. Conger & Edward Lawler, Building a High-Performing Board: How to Choose the Right Members, 
Business Strategy Review, 2001, Volume 12 Issue 3, pp11  
258 Maw Der Foo, Poh Kam Wong, & Andy Ong, Team diversity and external evaluation of business ideas, at: 
http://www.enterprise.nus.edu.sg/nec/events/sem/2002/pdf/Mawder_pps.pdf  
259 Tyson Report, Part IV 
260 Ibid. 
261 Williams, K.Y. and O’Reilly, Demography and diversity in organizations: A review of 40 years of 
research, Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol.20, 1998, pp77-140  
262 Goodstein, J., Gautam, K., & W. Boeker, The Effects of Board Size and Diversity on Strategic Change, 
Strategic, Management Journal, Volume 15, April, 1994, pp242 
263 Tyson Report. Part IV 
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Therefore, a wider search in the pool of independent directors is required. External advice 
or open advertising are encouraged, and terms and conditions of appointment of 
non-executive directors should be published265. Alternatively, an explanation should be 
given and justified if neither an external search consultancy nor open advertising has been 
used in the appointment of a chairman or a non-executive director266. 
In the United States, it is suggested that the nominating committee should be given the 
sole authority to retain and terminate any search firms to be used to identify the 
candidates for independent directors267. These provisions facilitate self-recommendation 
from the public pool of potential independent directors and reduce intervention from the 
executive teams.  
C. The involvement of a third party 
1. The free labour market of independent directors  
Although the pool of independent directors is enjoying higher priority in the pubic focus, 
it is still regarded as something self-regulated by the labour market. In this free market, 
the buyers are the companies who want to purchase the service of the talented 
independent directors through external advice or open advertising, and the seller is the 
candidate who wants to make a living on their experience, skill and knowledge as good 
independent directors. Since the most urgent issue that remains for corporate governance 
is how to strengthen the corporations’ own safeguards going forward against the internal 
abuses, the governments are reluctant to interfere much into this sale if both parties have 
                                                        
265 Ibid, suggested Code provision A.4.10 & A.4.11 
266 The Combined Code 2003, §A.4.6 
267 Proposal of Corporate Accountability and Listing Standard Committee, June 2002 
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a true consensus on it268. Therefore, corporate governance is regarded more like an 
internal mechanism to keep companies attractive to the investors. The governments are 
inclined to leave the nomination process, including the pool of independent directors to 
the companies’ nomination committees and the free labor market. As discussed in Section 
I, it is unfortunate that the nomination committees might be negatively influenced by the 
executive teams. In the meantime, the free labour market has its inherent disadvantages 
which would probably lead to the market malfunction. In the following sub-section, I 
want to use a popular economic theory – “market of lemons” – to demonstrate the risks 
and disadvantages that exist in the free market.  
2. Market of lemons – an economic theory 
This theory was introduced by the 2001 Nobel Prize winner, economist George Akerlof, 
from the typical scenario of the market for “lemon” cars, which are used to describe used 
cars in bad condition. It focuses on the role of asymmetric information and illustrates how 
market malfunction happens when buyers and sellers react upon different information269. 
The model market is a used car market, which is comprised of merely sellers and buyers 
and free from intervention of any other third parties. The tables 5-8 below show the 




                                                        
268 Charles H. King, Critical steps towards an independent board, the corporation’s first line of defense 
269 http://www.berkeley.edu/news/features/2001/nobel/  
270 George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 1970, 84, pp488-500 
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Table 5: 
Lemon Principle: Choice 
z Products  
  - Types: New or Used  
  - Quality: Good or Bad (Lemon)  
z Decision Process 
  - “approximate” the products’ lemon probability 
  - purchase a product  
  - update the products’ lemon probability 
★ Information advantage with the seller of used products  
It indicates: 
(1) In the market for used cars, there is no quality standard as in the new car 
market. There are both good and “lemon” cars.  
(2) The sellers are well informed of the conditions of the cars they sell, while 
the buyers have less access to such information. 
(3) The buyers would not clearly know the quality of the cars in person until 
they have brought them. Some cars are as good as the buyers’ expectations 
while some are not.  
Table 6: 
Simple Numerical Example 
                   Probability         WTATP271 PT       WTPTP272 PT 
    Good products     50%             1200           1500 
    Lemon           50%             500            700 
z Expected Value to Buyer 
    0.5*700 + 0.5*1500 = 1100 
z 500 < 1100 < 1200 
★ Only owners of BAD products will be wiling to sell! 
                                                        
TP
271




PT WTP: willing to pay, i.e. the maximum price you are willing to pay if you want to get something. 
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It indicates: 
(1) Averagely speaking, the proportion of good cars against bad cars is 50 to 50, 
i.e. the probability of ending up with a bad car is 50 percent. 
(2) The buyers know there are both good cars and lemons in the market, but 
they cannot tell them apart. Sometimes, the buyers will only offer the price of 
an average car. 
(3) This average price is likely lower than expectation of the owners of good 
cars, but definitely higher than that of the owners of bad cars. Therefore, only 
the latter would be wiling to sell. 
Table 7: 
Lemon Principle: Economics 
z P (Lemons) = P (Good) = P (Market) 
  - P (Market) < Value (Good) 
  - P (Market) > Value (lemon) 
z Implications 
  - good products not traded: “locked-in” 
  - bad products could be traded 
It indicates: 
(1) From the economic analytical view, the price the buyers offered is lower 
than the real value of good cars, but higher than that of “lemon” cars.   
(2) The owner of good cars is not willing to sell, while those of “lemon cars” 
are happy to do so. 
Table 8: 
Lemon Principle: Results 
z Average quality declines 
z Bad products drive out good ones 
z The market may not provide these products  
z Institutions are needed to correct the problem  
It indicates: 
(1) The direct result of the asymmetric information is that the bad cars drive out 
the good ones and therefore the average quality will decline from a long term 
view. 
(2) Therefore, the intervention of a powerful third party is suggested.  
Although George Akerlof’s work originates in the economic field of product markets, it 
has gradually been applied to such diverse areas as health insurance, financial markets, 
and employment contracts, etc. In this thesis, I borrow it to justify the intervention from a 
third party in the process of nominating independent directors.  
3. Intervention from a third party – lessons from the “market for lemons” 
(1) The analogy between the product market for used cars and the labour market 
for independent directors 
An analogy is made to find out whether the “market for lemons” exists in the nomination 
process of independent directors and therefore to justify the intervention of a third party 
in this process. 
In order to secure independence, it is better to nominate the independent directors from 
the public pool. To an extreme point, they are not known by any director of the company 
until they turn up with their application materials. In this scenario, the company which is 
in need of independent directors is analogous to the buyer while the potential independent 
directors themselves the sellers. There are some basic assumptions:  
(a) Each candidate clearly knows his or her ability, and will only accept the offer with a 
numeration package which is not below his or her real value; 
(b) In order to beat other competitors and get the job, the candidates are very likely to 
make exaggerated statements about their ability.  
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(c) Although the company knows that there are capable as well as incapable candidates, 
sometimes it is not easy to tell them apart, or to tell their real value. 
On most occasions, the company will pay an average remuneration, i.e. market price, to 
the candidates, regardless to a certain degree of their real value. The capable candidates 
might be deterred from the low payments which do not correspond to their outstanding 
ability and heavy onus if they become independent directors. The overall effect might be 
that the incapable candidates drive out the capable ones and the overall quality of 
candidates for independent directors would decrease273. This effect deviates from the 
expectation that the public has of independent directors.  
(2) Who is eligible to be the third party to intervene? 
Because of the executives’ involvement in the process of appointment and the possibility 
of the existence of a “market for lemons”, the selected independent directors might not be 
well qualified and equipped to monitor. As a solution, a third party is recommended to 
interfere with the nomination process and break down the asymmetric information. The 
nomination committees could also rely on the third party when they have difficulties in 
making nominations rather than on the executive teams. This would help to enhance 
quality and independence of the candidates.  
Although corporate governance is defined as an internal system encompassing policies, 
processes and people, which serves the needs of shareholders and other stakeholders, by 
                                                        
273 Although this theory is applicable elsewhere, there is no certain evidence showing that the theory is also 
valid when it comes to people. The value of a candidate could be evaluated through his educational 
background, working experience, recommendation letters from celebrities in his field, etc. However, there is 
also a possibility that the risk of “market for lemons” will happen in the free labor market to a certain extent. 
Therefore, the incapable candidates may drive out the capable ones. I present this analogy here just as a 
possible reason to support the intervention of a third party.  
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directing and controlling management activities and integrity, O’ Donovan has pointed 
out that “sound corporate governance is also reliant on external forces”, such as the 
marketplace, legislators, regulators, etc274. The current question is who could become 
such a third party. 
(i) Intervention from the public sector – Chinese practice 
The security exchange commission or its equivalents from the public sector, which have a 
certain degree of authority, might be among the best choices. However, it will be too 
radical and infeasible to allow them to interfere with this process directly through 
nominating candidates. What they should do is to provide the pool of the independent 
directors by publishing a list of capable independent directors.  
China has adopted this approach. The Vice President of CSRC, Ms. Shi Meilun 
announced, in the opening ceremony of a training course in October 22, 2002, the plan to 
establish a pool of independent directors from which the listed companies can select their 
candidates275. Furthermore, the CSRC is also involved in providing the training for the 
independent directors. The Guideline requires that independent directors and nominees 
for independent directors shall take part in the training organized by CSRC and its 
authorized institutions in accordance with the requirements of CSRC276. At present, 
CSRC has authorized the Securities Association of China, Tsinghua University277, and 
                                                        
 
274 Cabrielle O’ Donovan, Change Management – A Board Culture of Corporate Governance, Corporate 
Governance International, Volume 6, Issue 3, September 2003, pp29 
275 This piece of news is abstracted from:  
http://www.in.ah.cn/jjzx/AC90E178-3EDF-11D6-9427-00D0B7C2228A.htm  
276 Guidelines for introducing independent directors to the board of directors of listed companies, §I.5 
277 There are now only two places to provide such training, Beijing and Shanghai respectively. When it comes 
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National Accounting Institute to jointly undertake the training278. Comparing this model 
of training and that provided by the companies’ management in the commonwealth 
countries279, the Chinese model would have advantages in ensuring the independence of 
the new selected directors on the ground that training provided by CSRC could lessen the 
undue influence imposed by executive directors on the new independent directors. The 
United States has taken this approach into consideration. The Corporate Accountability 
and Listing Standards Committee recommend that the NYSE, in conjunction with leading 
authorities in corporate governance, develop a Directors Institute that would offer 
continuing education forums around the United States for both current and newly-elected 
directors280.  
The Chinese practice provides a feasible remedy to the problem incurred by the 
information asymmetry. Under such circumstances, anyone who wants to be an 
independent director should first be trained and ratified by the CSRC, and once they get 
the certificate, at least the public can trust that they have the basic capacity to assume this 
position281. And through publishing the names of the qualified independent directors, as 
                                                        
278 http://www.s-a-c.org.cn/train/info/notice/4.htm, this web page belongs to the Securities Institute of China, 
and is about the recruitment notice of the training course. It requires that applicants should be those who (1) 
are committed to be independent directors and contribute to enhance the regular operation of listed companies; 
(2) have the qualifications to be directors in line with the Companies Act and other related regulations; (3) 
have the basic knowledge about the operation, the governing laws and regulations of listed companies; (4) 
have five-years working experience in the field of law, accounting and others; (5) have enough time and 
energy to be independent directors. Anyone who fulfills these requirements can apply for this training. After 
successfully finishing all the required courses, the trainees can receive a certificate of independent directors 
issued jointly by Securities Institute of China and the universities in charge, and can be registered into the 
pool of the independent directors of the CSRC.  
279 Although the training of independent directors has been given more emphasis across the world, the United 
Kingdom vests the power as well as duty to give induction and further professional development to the new 
directors in the board of directors, see the Combined Code 2003 A.5.1. So does Singapore to require that 
every director should receive appropriate training when he is first appointed to the Board. China seems to go 
one step further beyond these countries at this point; it vests this power and responsibility on the CSRC. 
280 Proposal of Corporate Accountability and Listing Standard Committee, June 2002 
281 Li Yiliang & Du Tan, On implementation of independent directors’ certificate system, Lan Zhou 
Publication, Issue. 2, 2004, pp123   
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well as their resume, expertise, commitment taken currently and other useful 
information 282 , the companies could receive the latest updated, genuine and full 
information; they therefore need not to rely entirely on the self-recommendation of the 
applicants.  
Furthermore, providing the pool of candidates and the training by such a third party could 
also guarantee the independence of directors on the ground that (1) the nomination 
committee could have wider choice283, get rid of the improper involvement and influence 
imposed by the executives and therefore nominate those who are really independent from 
the management; (2) before a person becomes the independent director of a specific 
company, he could receive the requisite training, particularly in respect of the standard of 
business conduct and ethics, and know how to carry out the monitoring function 
independently when developing a mutual-respect and cooperative relationship with the 
management. Therefore, he might not be misled or improperly influenced by the 
executives at the beginning stage of his commitment when receiving the induction 
provided by the board.  
(ii) Help from the private sector – British practice  
However, the Chinese practice of providing the pool of independent directors might be 
too radical in the eye of other countries. Based on the assessment of the former public 
                                                        
282 Since the establishment of the pool of independent directors is still under plan, there is no detailed 
provision to regulate how the pool should be and how the public can have access to it. I here recommend that 
the CSRC should publish the related information about qualified independent directors in the website which 
is available to the public. Because this method can best facilitate the CSRC to update timely of the 
information and the companies to scan the list, analysis the capacity and decide their candidate.  
283 Otherwise, the nomination committee would nominate those who the current board member familiar with, 
i.e. college-mates, friends and others who are not precluded from the candidates by the definition of 
“independence” in the corporate governance code.  
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sector effort – ProNED284, DTI has decided not to develop its own list of qualified 
candidates of individuals with the skills and experience relevant to the non-executive 
director’s position in the commercial sector285. Its reason is that “developing a list of 
candidates without a careful assessment of company’s needs and without a broad, 
rigorous and transparent search process would be inconsistent and inappropriate”286. 
Furthermore, the growing number of databases of non-executive candidates, from both 
executive search firms and non-profit organizations in the private sector, should provide 
the adequate information and make a government database unnecessary287. The United 
States also encourages the nomination committees to utilize the search firms to identify 
the candidates288.  
These considerations are reasonable, but whether the Chinese practice would last long 
and produce positive results remains unknown. The Chinese practice merely provides a 
list of qualified independent directors for companies to choose. These people do not 
necessarily meet the requirements of each particular company. Therefore, the company 
should still make proactive use of private facilities to identify the talents they are looking 
for. To combine the intervention from the public sector as well as help from the private 
sector is a feasible method.  
D. Conclusion 
                                                        
284 ProNED was established by a number of public and quasi-public sponsors, with the mission to improve 
corporate governance by advice to companies on non-executive directors’ appointments. It has developed a 
database of potential non-executive directors’ candidates. However, ProNED’s public sector sponsors became 
uncomfortable with its increasing involvement in commercial activities. ProNED was ultimately bought out 
and its activities absorbed by a private sector global search firm. See in Tyson Report, Part VII. 
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It is strongly recommended that a pool of independent directors be established. It should 
be broad, diversified, transparent, updated and easily accessible to the public. Providing 
this pool of independent directors by the public sectors or private sectors may help to 
enhance the independence of independent directors. It is hard to tell which approach is 
better, as long as they can achieve the same goal that the pool of independent directors 
becomes more open and transparent.  
Section III. The nomination of independent directors 
A. Shareholders’ involvement in the nominating process 
After discussing the pool of directors, the next problem is who are entitled to choose the 
candidates from this pool, i.e. who will have a say in nominating the candidates for 
independent directors.  
According to the corporate governance code, this function is normally vested in the 
nomination committees in the commonwealth countries. However, the executives could 
possibly impose their will on this process. Therefore, in the United States, it is proposed 
that listed companies have a nominating committee composed entirely of independent 
directors289. This proposal might lead from one extreme – i.e. no nominating committee – 
to another extreme. The executives may be able to benefit themselves at the expense of 
the company, but not necessarily. Furthermore, most of them are honest and diligent. In 
order to spur their enthusiasm and create the harmonious culture in the board, their 
respect for future colleagues should be taken into consideration. For example, the 
nomination committees in the Unites Kingdom are comprised of both the executive 
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directors and independent directors who nonetheless make up the majority.  
There exists a risk that the executives would actually control the committee through 
undue influence. The empirical studies concerning the effectiveness of independent 
directors have shown the mixed results and suggested that having nominating committees 
would not necessarily be effective in nominating independent directors. Lucian Bebchuk 
asserted that such ineffectiveness might be due to the fact that the independent directors 
are board nominated290.  
As a result, shareholders’ involvement in the nominating process is encouraged. For 
example, China has adopted shareholder nomination in its corporate governance. The 
board of directors, the supervisory board and the shareholders who independently or 
jointly hold more than 1% of the shares issued by the listed company may nominate the 
independent directors291. In order to improve corporate governance, on October 14, 2003, 
the SEC proposed rules292 that would for the first time, as the SEC chairman described, 
provide a shareholder with a procedure that promotes access to the proxy process293. 
However, some critics in the United States have argued that measures have been taken, 
including the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the new listing standards of the NYSE based 
on the proposals of the Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee294, to 
                                                        
290 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Shareholder Access to the Ballot, The Business Lawyer, Chicago, Volume 59, Issue 
1, Nov. 2003, pp 62-63 
291 Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies, IV.1 
However, since there exists dominant, i.e. the State shareholder, in China, the Guideline should better not 
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Wang Rui, Regulation on independence of the independent directors, Management Research, Issue 4, 2003, 
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292 For details of the Shareholder Nomination Rules, see http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48626.htm.
293 Shareholder participation in the nomination of directors – the beginning of a new era in corporate 
governance, see at: http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/SLA_10232003.pdf  
294 These measurements would place the nomination of directors in the hands of independent directors in the 
nomination committee which is comprised wholly of independent directors.  
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solve the problem for which shareholder access is proposed. These recent reforms are 
likely to achieve a great success and there is consequently no need to make further steps 
in the reform, i.e. shareholders’ nomination of directors. Lipton and Rosenblum pointed 
out that “it seems only prudent to take the time to assess the impact of the far-reaching 
reforms that have just been adopted” 295 . However, although the composition of 
nominating committees of full independent directors might make improvement, it cannot 
be relied on to “obviate the need for the safety valve of shareholder nominations”296, let 
alone committees that are composed of some executive directors. The existence of the 
possibility of shareholder nomination might improve the performance of nomination 
committees and compel them to make sound and independent judgments on nomination. 
Although shareholder nomination of a company’s directors should happen infrequently, 
e.g. only when a company has a serious problem such as a continued decline in financial 
results or a troubling pattern of affiliated transactions, “the mechanism permitting direct 
shareholder nominations should be established as a precaution before things go wrong”297. 
Therefore, even though such a mechanism might not be used, it would play a beneficial 
role298.  
This argument is quite reasonable on the ground that although the nomination power is 
largely vested in the nomination committee, a shareholder nomination could remain as a 
check and balance during the nomination process among the shareholders, the nomination 
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committee and the executives.  
B. Proposals from ABA Task Force 
To facilitate shareholder involvement in the nominating process, a series of other 
mechanisms should be set up, such as cumulative voting, proxy solicitations by allowing 
internet distribution of nomination and proxy materials, etc.299
The Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association Task Force (“ABA Task 
Force”) also advocates shareholder access to the nomination process. It has advanced five 
alternative methods on shareholder proposals for increasing shareholder participation in 
nominating corporate directors. They are: (a) enhancing the input of shareholders into the 
processes of the nominating committee of the company’s board; (b) allotting specific 
board positions for nomination by shareholders through the nominating committee of the 
company’s board; (c) simplifying independent proxy solicitation for so-called short lists 
of shareholder-nominated directors; (d) permitting shareholders to use the company’s 
proxy machinery to solicit proxies for their own nominees; and (e) allowing more leeway 
for shareholder proposals defining the process of nominating directors for a specific 
company300.  
C. The supplementary mechanism 
Shareholder access to the ballot is a sound measure to ensure that the nominated 
independent directors would be independent from the executives. On the other hand, as 
shareholders themselves are interest groups in the company, the most important and 
inherent defect of shareholder nomination is the possibility that shareholders’ direct 
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nomination would possibly lead to the election of independent directors with “special 
interests” 301, and undermine their independence standards accordingly on the ground that 
they represent the interests of a specific shareholder or a specific group of shareholders. 
Therefore, the shareholders’ nomination should be merely a supportive guarantee to the 
functions of the nomination committee and cannot replace the independent judgment of 
the committee.  
In order to make the shareholder nomination a moderate mechanism, Lucian Bebchuk 
advanced several steps, including: (a) this mechanism would only apply to attempts to 
elect such a minority of directors that those nominated by shareholders would constitute a 
small proportion of the board; (b) the mechanism would eliminate some but not all of the 
potential costs involved in an effective campaign for a shareholder-nominated candidate 
so that the shareholders would still bear the financial risk if they could not get their 
nominee passed through and therefore be deterred from making rash nominations; (c) the 
mechanism would limit access to the proxy contests to such “qualified” shareholders or 
groups of shareholders that meet certain minimum ownership and holding requirements 
and that not all of the shareholders are entitled to make a nomination302.  
Furthermore, in order to ensure the independence of shareholder-nominated directors, 
“such a director who was elected would appear automatically on the ballot in the next 
election”303. This solution might effectively disconnect the elected independent directors 
from owing their re-appointment to their shareholder nominators. Once they are elected, 
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they would become no longer at the mercy of the specific shareholder or group of 
shareholders. All that they need to do for successful re-election is to bring in to the 
company their independent and objective judgment, to enhance the shareholders’ value 
taken as a whole, and to gain the support from the majority shareholders, rather than to 
serve the “specific interests” of those who initially brought them into the board. The 
shareholders’ involvement to an appropriate extent could be considered beneficial in 
corporate governance, particularly in those countries where the companies’ shareholdings 
are so dispersed that shareholder activism then becomes greatly encouraged.  
Section IV. The election of independent directors  
The election in the shareholders’ meeting is the last but not the least step in the whole 
appointment process of independent directors. In this process, their independence is most 
likely to be undermined in the proxy contest. A large number of dispersed shareholders in 
the commonwealth countries tend to be reluctant to care for the business of the companies 
in which they have invested. At the expense of the company, the management could 
easily collect enough votes through the proxy voting process so as to have a powerful 
voice in the election. Under such circumstances, the independent directors elected lack 
adequate independence to monitor the management to whom they owe their election. 
In order to solve this problem, some commentators suggest that the shareholders give 
instructions on selection as well as the proxy right to those who represent them to vote. 
Therefore, their will could be respected during the selection even though they are absent 
from the meeting. This idea seems difficult to operate. The purpose of the proxy 
solicitation is to allow some persons to collect the voting rights of those dispersed 
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shareholders who show indifference in the company’s affairs. Since they have no interest 
in the election process, they are unlikely to read through the piles of proxy materials and 
make a deliberate decision on who they want to vote for, let alone give instructions to 
their agents. Some other commentators suggest the shareholders play a proactive role and 
compete with the management in the proxy contest. However, the shareholders are 
reluctant to do so because of the high costs.  
In China, the solution is to encourage the independent directors to play a positive role in 
the proxy contest. The Guideline provides that the independent directors can solicit the 
proxies before convening of the shareholders’ meeting304. The independent directors 
might share the same equal status as the company’s management when it comes to proxy 
solicitation. For example, they could have the access to the shareholders’ list; they could 
take advantage of the company’s resources to facilitate the delivery of the proxy materials. 
Furthermore, the independent directors bear the general fiduciary duty under which they 
shall vote in the best interests of the company. Therefore, the participation of the 
independent directors would offset the disadvantages resulting from the company 
management’s domination of the proxy contest and voting for their personal interests305. 
Proxy voting by the independent directors would bring in a relatively more objective and 
reasonable election than those by the management or the shareholders. While this gives 
independent directors the chance to re-elect themselves, this can be remedied by 
excluding independent directors when they themselves are candidates.  
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The problem with the independent directors’ participation in the proxy solicitation is the 
high requirement on commitment of time. The independent directors are part-timers in the 
company, and most of them would spend aggregately no more than one month per year in 
the company’s affairs. Furthermore, their remuneration is fixed to a large extent and is 
dramatically less than the executives’. Under such circumstances, they would have less 
incentive to involve themselves in the exhausting battle against the powerful management. 
To participate is their right, rather than their duty; the independent directors could 
abandon such right as they wish. Therefore, if the provision of independent directors’ 
participation in the proxy contest is stipulated, the relative incentive should be followed 
in order to encourage their activism.  
Section V. Conclusion  
A director selection process which is free from the undue intervention from the company 
management is essential to achieving board independence. In this chapter, the focus is 
how to enhance the independence of directors in their appointment process, including the 
initial pool of candidates, the nomination and the election of independent directors.  
Since the empirical studies generally tend to show that the presence of management 
involvement, especially where they have strong bargaining power306, in the director 
selection process is associated with a less independent board307, the importance of 
intervention by a third party, such as public regulators or private search firms, is 
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recommended. However, since the appointment of independent directors is the company’s 
internal affair, such an external third party could only play an auxiliary or supervisory 
role and could not replace the existing appointment procedures in the company. I am of 
the opinion that this third party should contribute their effort in the nomination process of 
independent directors on: (a) organizing the necessary preliminary training and 
qualifications, (b) providing a diverse pool of qualified candidates, (c) nominating a 
certain proportion of candidates or at least performing the decisive right in whether the 
candidates nominated by the company itself are suitable or not.  
In addition to the third party’s involvement in the appointment procedure, the 
shareholders’ nomination and the independent directors’ participation in the proxy 
contests are also encouraged to compete with the company management and offset the 
undue influence by the management in the appointment process. In a word, the activism 
of the parties other than the company management, including authoritative regulators, the 
private sector, shareholders, and independent directors, is greatly encouraged to ensure an 
objective and transparent appointment procedure and ensure the independence of the 
directors.  
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Chapter 8 The remuneration of independent directors 
Section I. The problems with remuneration of independent directors 
Remuneration is another significant and controversial topic concerning the independence 
of directors. The current practice of remuneration is trapped in a dilemma.  
It has been asserted that the current level of the remuneration package for independent 
directors is not commensurate with their increasingly great responsibilities308. Therefore, 
there would not be enough incentive to ensure that the independent directors spend 
adequate time and effort on the company’s affairs. On the other hand, if the remuneration 
is too high, the independent directors would probably fawn themselves on the persons 
who could offer them such a luxurious and attractive remuneration package and lose their 
required independence.  
In addition, although through the remuneration committees, the independent directors can 
determine the executive directors’ payments309, their payments are determined by the 
board as a whole310 in which the executive directors have a great say. This would possibly 
hamper the independent directors to make an objective decision on the executive’s 
payment because of such mutual check as well as mutual benefit. Since the remuneration 
is offered by the persons who the independent directors are appointed to supervise, the 
independent directors would be deterred from whistle-blowing when necessary. Therefore, 
the remuneration is another complicated situation that deserves more concern if we want 
to enhance the independence of independent directors. Generally speaking, we need a set 
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of remuneration policies, which helps set remuneration at an appropriate level, an 
appropriate form, and should be paid by an appropriate party, to ensure the independence 
of directors.  
Section II. What constitutes appropriate remuneration?  
A. The appropriate level of remuneration  
The Combined Code stipulates that the level of remuneration for independent directors 
should reflect the time commitment and the responsibilities of the roleTP311 PT. However, 
generally speaking, the situation is that the remuneration is low. Currently, average annual 
compensation of independent directors is about ￡44,500 for FTSE 100 firms, ￡34,800 
for FTSE 250 firms, and ￡23,221 for other listed companies, which is small compared 
to the annual compensation levels of chief executives, top-level management and other 
business professionalsTP312 PT. Companies usually do not pay independent directors large 
amounts of money and the remuneration is rarely tied to corporate performance; 
consequently from a purely financial perspective, an independent director has little to 
gain by being diligent TP313 PT.  
On the other hand, compared with the increasing responsibilities of the independent 
directors, the risks associated with the position and the growth in the pay packets of their 
executive counterparts, it is not surprising that there is upward pressure on fee levels for 
those non-executives who truly add value. Over a third of FTSE 350 company secretaries 
believe that fees for non-executive directors should be higherTP314 PT. As a matter of fact, for 
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independent directors of the best performing firms, financial rewards can be significantly 
large, up to millions of dollars over the first several years”315.  
If the remuneration for independent directors is too low, they have little incentive to work 
hard, while in cases where the remuneration is too high, there is a risk that they would 
lose their independence to some extent316. As Fama and Jensen describe, the outside 
directors use their directorships to signal to the internal and external markets that they are 
experts… “the signals are credible when the direct payment to them is small”317. For 
example, some minority shareholders in China rejected high remuneration to independent 
directors because they think it will affect their independence318. The reason might be that 
the independence and justness of the directors would possibly decrease when their 
payments rise with their increasing sense of financial belonging to the company319 and the 
insiders – the management in the Anglo-American countries, and the representatives of 
the State shareholder – who control their remuneration320. Therefore, some commentators 
suggest that reputation incentives should be primarily employed with the cash payment as 
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an auxiliary method321. In such circumstances, some companies listed in NASDAQ 
employed some independent directors who require no payment, since “they regard the 
reputation, the independent status and the healthy operation of the company as the best 
reward instead of material interests”322. In a word, the level of fees paid should be 
appropriate to attract, retain and motivate qualified individuals who are able to effectively 
contribute to the proper oversight of the company. 
Given the diversity and size of the companies and differing complexities of various 
businesses, it is not appropriate to recommend a standard quantum of fees for all 
non-executive directors 323 . For example, some empirical studies show a positive 
relationship between total compensation of outside directors and firm size324. The level of 
fees paid should take into consideration the qualifications and experience of directors 
required by the company, the general level of fees earned by directors in their 
professional capacities or billed by professionals like lawyers and accountants, time spent 
in preparation for meetings and actual attendance, indirect costs and expenses incurred by 
the directors and also that the fees be fair to the company concerned.325 There is a lack of 
evidence that whether the remuneration package is high or low has much to do with the 
independence of directors. However, there is a possible conflict between independent 
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directors’ remuneration and their independence “when the independent directors’ 
remuneration represents a substantial fraction of their total annual income”326. This 
situation is common when the independent directors are from non-commercial sectors327. 
In such circumstances, the level of remuneration should be well designed to maintain the 
independence of such directors. Some Chinese scholars also admit that the independence 
of directors is rarely affected by the level of remuneration if such remuneration only 
constitutes a small proportion of their asset package328.  
B. The appropriate form of remuneration 
1. The increasing use of performance – related remuneration  
Directors’ compensation had always followed an identical structure – a fixed annual 
retainer – nevertheless, more and more firms have paid the annual retainer in equity since 
the late 1980s329. Nowadays, it is a standard practice that a significant proportion of 
executive directors’ remuneration should be linked with corporate and individual 
performance330, including annual bonus, shares, share options, etc.  
However, in corporate governance regulations, remuneration in such a form is still not 
encouraged as a means to compensate the independent directors331. The reality is quite the 
opposite. In 1992, just over 200 firms in the Fortune 1000 offered stock option 
compensation, but by 1997 almost 500 firms in the same list provided a stock based 
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remuneration for outside directors332. In Singapore, over 44% of companies indicated that 
they pay benefits to non-executive directors; for these companies, 9 out of 10 use share 
options to pay benefits to non-executive directors333. David Yermack found out that most 
of the directors now receive more lucrative performance based incentives than previously, 
including a significant portion of their compensation in either stocks or stock options334. 
For example, Dell made large annual stock option awards to outside directors and gave 
them the opportunity to exchange their cash retainers for more options335. Linn and Park 
(2003) investigated sample companies from the period 1996 to 1999 and found out a 
positive relationship between outside directors’ compensation and the investment 
opportunity set336: Firms with more investment opportunities pay the outside directors 
more heavily with stock-based forms of compensation than cash. It seems that companies 
put more emphasis on incentive-based compensation to motivate outside directors to act 
in the interests of shareholders.  
2. The stock option as remuneration to independent directors 
Within all kinds of performance related forms of remuneration to independent directors, 
the stock option has been the most controversial.  
According to the Greenbury Report, the stock option is a contract where the company 
grants to its directors the right to buy a given number of shares in the company at or after 
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some future date, not at the price then prevailing, but at (or up to 15 percent below) the 
price at the time the option was granted337.  
A well constructed stock based compensation plan could encourage careful and 
constructive risk-taking by executives, induce them to make appropriate investment 
decisions, and align the interests of shareholders and executives so that the overall 
performance of the firm is enhanced338. Some persons are concerned that unless the 
independent directors have their stake in the company’s performance, they will not have 
enough incentive to fulfill their duties seriously, which means that under the current 
system, independent directors will fail to be sufficiently vigilant in monitoring executive 
performance and in taking steps to deter self-serving managerial conduct.   
Under the stock option plan, the reward the directors receive reflects the gain resulting 
from any increase in the share price above the exercise price339. It is hard to fix an 
appropriate exercise price neither so easy to achieve that the company gains little benefits 
nor so difficult to achieve that it would frustrate the directors’ activism. Even where the 
exercise price is well designed, the directors might possibly gain large amounts of 
benefits from factors which are not related with their performance, such as the overall rise 
of the stock market, etc. What is worse is that stock options could lead directors to focus 
on the firms’ share price instead of its long-term plans and strategies and therefore 
encourage all kinds of tricks to manipulate the share price, such as timing their news 
release to please the market and boost their company’s share price and the value of their 
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own stock options340. A leading compensation expert predicts that heavily concentrating 
compensation on short term market priced incentives, rather than on "real" economic 
performance, is not good for the business341. When it comes to the independent directors, 
the disadvantage of stock options is more serious. One of the benefits which independent 
directors are thought to provide is a detached and objective viewpoint. If the 
remuneration schemes induce the independent directors to become deeply involved in 
corporate business affairs, this perspective would be lost342.  
Furthermore, some scholars argue that the stock options are a cost to the company that 
grants them343. Because the money for funding them comes “directly from the balance 
sheet either in the way that the company concerned goes out in the market and buys the 
equivalent number of shares being exercised, or in the way that the company concerned 
issues new shares”, both of which potentially do harm to shareholders’ interests. The 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) published a proposal on November 7th, 
2002 to force companies to treat options as an expense344. Some investors also doubt 
whether the stock options would do good or harm to the effectiveness of independent 
directors; they are scrutinizing stock options, assessing whether they are a good 
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investment or a waste of corporate assets, said Richard H. Wagner, president of Strategic 
Compensation Research Associates in New York345.  
Finally, the financial incentives may not be significantly important to the individuals who 
act as independent directors, because board appointments are prestigious, and could bring 
potentially valuable business connections. They would value their track record because 
they can rely on it to secure other board appointments and perhaps lucrative consulting 
contracts, otherwise, they might be criticized by the press and the shareholders. With this 
sort of unfavorable publicity, the reputation of the non-executive directors will suffer in 
some measure346. In addition, Yermack (2002) also finds evidence that independent 
directors “experience meaningful performance incentives from both the possibility of 
replacement and the attraction of new board seats in other forms”347.   
Therefore, the remuneration of independent directors should not vary in accordance with 
share price fluctuations or accounting profits and should be fixed on a periodic basis and 
are usually set by referring to the practice adopted by companies of similar size and 
status348. Companies should re-align their compensation programs to pay for “real 
strategic and financial performance”349. Therefore, the efforts which are of potential value 
to the company and the shareholders in the long run should be appreciated and 
compensated accordingly; even they are not reflected in the short-term share price. 
However, a study shows that the incentive effects of outside directors’ option plans are 
                                                        
345 Adam Bryant, What could possibly be wrong with stock options?1997, at:  
www.smeal.psu.edu/faculty/huddart/InTheNews/NYTimesArticle1997.shtml  
346 Cheffins B.R, Company Law: theory, structure, and operation, pp615 
347 David Yermack, Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors, 2002, pp2298 
348 Cheffins B.R. Company Law: theory, structure and operation, pp101 
349  Ira M. Millstein, Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public 
Companies, 2002 
                                                                                   - 133 - 
viewed favorably by some investors, who perceive the appointment of independent 
directors without option based compensation to be of lower quality and have weaker 
incentives to monitor350. For the sake of flexibility and preference of each company, 
although the Combined Code generally prohibits share options for the independent 
directors, exceptionally, if options are granted, shareholder approval should be sought in 
advance and any shares acquired by exercise of the options should be held until at least 
one year after the non-executive director leave the board 351 . This provision also 
encourages the independent directors to be more concerned about the long-term 
development and interests of the company, rather than to manipulate the share price or 
other shortsighted activities. Furthermore, prompt disclosure of all transactions in the 
company's stock by corporate executives and directors should be encouraged as a security 
measure352. Under such circumstances, some firms are more likely to adopt option plans 
in order to align their interests with that of the independent directors, especially those 
with high institutional ownership353.  
However, for the sake of alignment of interests, equity ownership is enough. The equity 
ownership by independent directors, which reflects the convergence of interests between 
managers and shareholders, could be positively associated with the firm’s performance 
and market valuation354. Therefore, it has become increasingly common for part of the 
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fees payable to independent directors to be used for the subscription of shares but not 
options355.  
In China, equity is rarely granted to the independent directors, let alone stock options. 
The listed companies grant the appropriate allowance to the independent director and the 
independent directors do not receive any extra non-disclosed interests and compensation 
from the listed company, its major shareholders, or other interested entities and 
individuals other than the above-mentioned allowance356. 
Therefore, I am of the opinion that the form of remuneration for the independent directors 
should be fixed in order to keep them independent. At the same time, the adoption of 
stock-based benefits is not strictly prohibited if the shareholders regard it as beneficial to 
do so; and some conditions must be followed to ensure the independence, for example, 
setting the upper limit of such benefits, stipulating the date to realize such benefits, etc357. 
The operation of stock options that are granted to the independent directors should be 
different from that granted to the executive directors and senior management, to avoid 
diminishing their independence358.   
C. Who should decide the remuneration for independent directors? 
1. The inter-relationship between independent and executive directors 
The issue of who should decide the remuneration for independent directors is greatly 
related to the independence of directors. In order to avoid potential conflict of interests 
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and secure that the remuneration is fairly decided, there is a general principle that no 
director should be involved in deciding his or her own remuneration359. Under this 
principle, the remuneration committee is set up to take charge of setting the executives’ 
remuneration.  
On the other hand, the board itself or, where required by the Articles of Association, the 
shareholders should determine the remuneration of the non-executive directors within the 
limits set in the Articles of Association360. However, the latter situation rarely happens, 
mainly due to the fact that the standard practice around the world is that the remuneration 
should be proposed by the board of directors and approved by the shareholders’ meeting, 
e.g. China361.  
This crossing relationship on remuneration determination would hamper the independent 
directors to objectively judge and monitor the executives effectively, because they would 
partially owe their remuneration to the executives.  
2. Shareholder activism in the remuneration design 
Some people argue that even though the shareholders have no access to propose the 
independent directors’ remuneration, they could make the final decision on the proposal. 
Therefore, their activism, especially the institutional investors’, should be encouraged 
when the remuneration packages come to the shareholders’ meeting for approval. If the 
packages are not suitable, they should not hesitate to vote against them. The principles 
drawn up by the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee oblige the institutional 
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360 Combined Code 2003, B.2.3 
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shareholders to intervene in terms of inappropriate remuneration levels, incentive 
packages or severance packages362.  
However, it is unfortunate that these events did not happen until the landmark rebellion 
against the remuneration policies of the drug giant GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) in May 2003. 
A slender majority of GSK shareholders voted against a pay package which would have 
entitled chief executive Jean-Pierre Garnier to a pay-off of up to 22 million pounds363. It 
was reported as the first time that shareholders in a British company had rejected its 
remuneration policy. This was an exciting good beginning and marked the high point of a 
tide of shareholder resentment over fat cat pay in recent months364. The institutional 
investors are playing an important role in this event: the National Association of Pension 
Funds (NAPF) and the Association of British Insurers (ABI), whose members together 
account for more than 40% of investments in the London stock market, both disapproved; 
the powerful California Public Employees' Retirement System (Calpers), a big GSK 
shareholder, also voiced opposition365. During the months after that, several other firms, 
such as the supermarket group Tesco, the insurer Royal & Sun Alliance, the oil giant 
Shell, and Barclays bank, have also faced significant levels of shareholder dissent over 
executive payment. 
On the other hand, we should also notice the general habit of abstention by the unsatisfied 
shareholders. We can see from the reports that there are still a large number of 
shareholders, including the institutional shareholders who are reluctant to play an active 
                                                        
362 The responsibilities of institutional shareholders and agents – statement of principles, Section 4 
363 Tesco Wins Pay Battle, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2986216.stm  
364 Tesco Targeted Over “Fat Cat” Pay, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3045143.stm  
365 Glaxo defeated by shareholders, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3038381.stm  
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role in the remuneration determination process. They would rather “exit” than use their 
“voice” in the company. For example, there are a relatively large number of abstentions 
and no votes (about 17% of the votes) on the executive pay issue of Tesco366; 7% of the 
shareholders at the Royal & Sun Alliance abstained from voting on the company’s pay 
awards to top executives367.  
3. Intervention from a third party outside the company and indirect payment system 
The resolution of shareholders’ activism might be an effective controlling mechanism 
from inside the company and whether it would bring about positive results still remains to 
be seen. As an alternative to this internal mechanism, many Chinese scholars recommend 
intervention of a third party from outside the company in order to break down this 
inter-relationship between the executives and the independent directors, and therefore to 
secure the independence of the directors. The underlying purpose of such intervention is, 
through laying the remuneration in the hands of an external and impartial third party, to 
keep the independent directors financially independent from the company they serve; 
therefore, they could maintain independence when dealing with company affairs368.  
Under such circumstances, some Chinese scholars suggest the establishment of 
independent directors’ “indirect payment system"369. This indirect payment system is 
comprised of a set of basic rules370: 
(a) the independent directors are regarded as outside monitors who should be 
                                                        
366 Tesco Wins Pay Battle, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2986216.stm
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independent; 
(b) the independent directors shall monitor the insiders of the company and protect the 
interests of minorities and other stakeholders; 
(c) the independent directors do not receive their remuneration directly from the company; 
instead, from a non-profitable intermediary. 
This system distinguishes those persons who assume the amount of money and who 
decide and make the payment371. The analysis concerning the feasibility of the payment 








decides and makes 
the payment) 
Analysis 
1 The listed company The listed company Reasonable but less independent  
2 The listed company The government Reasonable and independent 
* 3  The listed company The intermediaries  Reasonable and strongly independent 
4 The government The listed company Less reasonable and less independent 
5 The government The government Less reasonable and independent  
6 
The government The intermediaries Less reasonable and strongly 
independent 
                                                        
371 Some problems about payment to the independent directors, at: 
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 Therefore, the third project is the most ideal372. First, independent directors work for and 
make contributions to the listed company and they should be compensated from the listed 
company. Second, that the intermediaries decide and make the payment would help 
maintain the independence of the directors. The next problem is who should be such an 
intermediary and how it interferes with the process of payment.  
One of the recommendations is to set up the guild of professional independent directors 
under CSRC373. In order to improve the transparency of the delivery of independent 
directors’ allowance, the total amount of the allowance which is going to be paid to the 
independent directors should be submitted to the guild by the company. The guild would 
distribute the amount submitted by the company within the independent directors of that 
particular company in according with the performance of each director.  
Another recommendation is to set up the independent directors’ remuneration fund under 
each stock exchange374. The companies should submit a certain amount of money to the 
stock exchange in which they are listed in accordance with the standard guideline issued 
by the stock exchange. The stock exchange uses these submissions to set up the 
independent directors’ remuneration fund which is responsible for making the payment to 
the directors on the basis of performance evaluation.  
These two recommendations are similar, pursuing the same goal, i.e. to make the payment 
                                                        
372 Ibid. 
373  Shanghai Securities Consulting Co., Ltd, The Market Need Professional Independent Directors, 
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374 Wang Xiaodong & Su Xiangyang, Suggestion on Establishment of Independent Directors Remuneration 
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to the independent directors more objective and transparent, and facilitate the independent 
directors to be rid of the indirect control from inside the listed company through the 
remuneration. The evaluation of individual capacity and performance could be carried out 
fairly and publicly by the third parties. If the independent directors commit more time and 
energy to the company, and make every effort to perform their duties and protect the 
interest of the shareholders, they should receive a compensation higher than the average 
level accordingly; on the other hand, if they do not carry out the internal monitoring 
effectively and pamper the insider controller to infringe the interests of the companies and 
shareholders, they should receive a compensation lower than the average level 
accordingly, or even receive a fine when they commit severe malpractice. Except for the 
compensation paid out by the guild or the fund, the company itself should not make any 
other payment to independent directors in any form.  
The guild or the fund has the discretionary power to decide the level of remuneration of 
each particular independent director. Under such circumstances, the independent directors 
belong to two organizations concurrently: one is the listed companies in which they fulfill 
their monitoring functions, and the other is the guild or the fund from which they could 
realize their financial expectation375.  
These two recommendations solve the undue influence by executives as remuneration is 
concerned. However, one of the inherent disadvantages of such third parties’ intervention 
is that it might deviate from the actual situation of each particular company and therefore 
be a “one size fits all” approach. However, what is being encouraged is that the major 
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part of the remuneration should comprise fixed fees, when the total amount that each 
company should submit is decided, it should be not less than the amount of the number of 
independent directors multiplying an average level of payment fixed according to the size 
of the company, the registered capital, the shareholding structure, the corporate 
governance structure, the average level of remuneration, etc. Furthermore, when the guild 
or the fund thinks that some independent directors should receive more compensation 
because of their extra work, such as involvement in the proxy solicitation, they could ask 
the company for an additional amount and then make the payment to such independent 
directors. Under such circumstances, the independence consideration and the need for 
flexibility are balanced.  
Nonetheless, such recommendations are still theoretical and have not put into practice yet, 
and whether they would work or not or even produce more serious problems is not clear 
yet. They have some problems to solve so as to be more practical and feasible. First, it is 
hard for the guild or the fund to monitor and evaluate each independent director so as to 
make a fair distribution in accordance with their performance. Second, it is hard for the 
guild or the fund to decide the total submission with an appropriate amount because that 
there are too many factors to be taken into consideration. Therefore, we can see that the 
biggest problem of intervention from a third party is that the workload is too heavy to 
carry out properly, so that the intervention might be impractical. Some measures should 
be taken to overcome these disadvantages.  
In order to resolve these problems and make the indirect payment system more feasible, 
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some scholars propose the establishment of an independent directors’ association376. All 
the independent directors must be registered as a member of the association. The 
association is not responsible for deciding the remuneration; the listed company decides 
the remuneration budget (including the number of independent directors, the standard of 
remuneration decision and performance evaluation, and each independent director’s 
remuneration package, etc) within the lower and upper limit set out by the association, 
submits the budget and transfers the money accordingly to the association377. The 
association is responsible for guiding and approving the budget, administering the 
independent directors, and making the payment. The association interferes directly with 
the decision of remuneration only under such extraordinary circumstances as accounting 
scandal, etc. Such a compromise is more feasible and practicable.  
Section III. Conclusion  
This chapter deals with the independent directors’ remuneration, another important factor 
concerning their independence. It is admitted that in order to provide enough incentive, 
the total amount the remuneration should be varied for different persons, according to the 
size of the company they serve, their experience, etc. The independent directors could 
have huge compensation packages. However, it is better that the constitution of the 
package be based on fixed fees without performance-related variants. If such variants are 
required to align the interests of the shareholders and the independent directors, the equity 
ownership could be considered, but it is better not to grant stock options for the sake of 
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their independent status as the monitors of the company. Furthermore, there are some 
recommendations that the compensation should be decided and granted by a third party 
rather than the board. This measure is too radical and its effects remain unclear. At least, 
it points a possible path toward the issue of independence in remuneration.  
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Chapter 9 Moral requirements for independent directors 
Even if the definition of “independent directors” is exhaustive and the relative provisions 
concerning independent directors are complete and perfect, we cannot be sure that 
independent directors are truly independent or will maintain their independent status for 
ever. There is a possibility that such a director may lose his independence though the 
establishment of friendship with executives, etc. After all, “independence is a state of 
mind”: given that human relationships are involved, people can only rely on the integrity 
of individuals who take on the role of directors to ensure that they keep an independent 
mind to perform their duties378. “Ultimate changes proposed or enactment of new laws is 
not a substitute for ethics”379. Therefore, the Tyson report regards integrity and high 
ethical standards as essential for effective independent directors, while other qualities are 
required as well, such as sound judgment, the ability and willingness to challenge and 
probe, strong interpersonal skills, etc380. Although ethical independence is a state of mind 
which needs the directors’ own effort to maintain, the guidelines or training could help 
them to achieve the goal. For example, adhering to the belief that corporate scandals do 
not reflect shortcomings of the corporate governance structure, but failures of human 
morality, the Business Roundtable and 12 leading business schools announced a $3 
million agreement to create an institute to teach practical ethics to current and future 
business leaders381.  
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Chapter 10 Conclusion 
I want to restate that there is a gap between theory and reality about independent directors. 
This is not a very complete and mature system to cure the “agency costs”; many aspects 
are under review and improvement. We have every reason to expect that independent 
directors will really play a larger role in corporate governance in the near future.  
As trade barriers fall, markets expand, information flows improve and restrictions on 
investment disappear, it is becoming progressively easier for those in one country to buy 
shares in corporations elsewhere. In a competition for global funds, sophisticated 
investors will be attracted to jurisdictions which have structures that well serve 
shareholders’ interests. A crucial element in the attractiveness of a particular locality will 
be its system of corporate governance. Local norms which served important historical 
purposes may begin to fall away as they make domestic markets seem inaccessible or 
deficient from a global perspective382. Whether the independent directors are independent 
is crucial to the success of corporate governance; the success of corporate governance is 
one of the key elements to Chinese corporate reform and economic prosperity, as well as 
to the triumph in the global commercial competition. Maybe the independent directors 
cannot satisfy the people with their performance because of the lack of independence. 
However, independent directors are in theory good supervisors and necessary for 
corporate governance. All that they need is more time and more legal support to fill the 
gap between the theory and the practice. Once they are independent indeed, they would 
definitely do a good job and be valuable to the companies and draw investors from both 
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home and abroad to invest for the future prosperity of the company and the national 
economy at large.  
There is still a long way ahead to enhance the corporate governance standards for those 
most developed countries in this world, let along China. The unique Chinese corporate 
governance system faces many limiting factors and needs time and effort from the whole 
society to improve. Whether the corporate governance system, especially the 
newly-introduced independent directors system, can work is important to corporate 
reform. The development of corporate governance is a long term process, and cannot be 
achieved overnight. However, the awareness of corporate governance and the effort we 
make would accelerate this process.  
I hope my thesis would theoretically contribute to this process.  
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